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NOTES AND COMMENTS
BEYOND THE KEN OF THE COURTS: A CRITIQUE OF
JUDICIAL REFUSAL TO REVIEW THE COMPLAINTS
OF CONVICTS
"Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes"*
Juvenal, Satires, vi, 1. 347
FRom one point of view, the Second Circuit's holding in Winston v'. United
States 1 and its companion case, Muniz v. United States 2-that a prisoner can
sue the government to recover for injuries suffered while in prison tinder the
Federal Tort Claims Act-is merely a tidying up operation, clearing out some
rubble left by an atavistic judicial restriction on Congress' waiver of sovereign
immunity. However, far more may be at stake in Winston and Munig than
a narrow holding under the Federal Tort Claims Act. For the Second Circuit,
in departing from the unanimous precedent of numerous courts, has rejected a
doctrine which has been almost solely responsible for the inefficacy of all modes
of redress theoretically available to prisoners.3 That doctrine-henceforth
labelled the "hands-off doctrine" 4 -states that "courts are without power to
supervise prison administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules
or regulations."6'
The hands-off doctrine represents a denial of jurisdiction 0 over the subject
matter of petitions from prisoners alleging some form of mistreatment or con-
testing some deprivation undergone during imprisonment. Some, if not most
of these alleged deprivations are a necessary and expected result of being an
inmate of a penal institution.i Mere confinement restricts freedom of movement.
*"But who will watch the keepers themselves ?"
1. 305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3183 (U.S. Dec. 4,
1962) (No. 464).
2. 305 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1962), cert granted, 31 U.S.L. WssK 3183 (U.S. Dec. 4,
1962) (No. 464).
3. Even if Winston, Muniz or both are reversed, it seems likely that a trend which
has been developing over the past decade or more will continue. Indeed, in two cases which
have come down since Winston and Muniz, the courts have assumed a more radical and
directly supervisory role in reviewing prison discipline on the merits than that displayed by
the Second Circuit. In re Riddle, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304 (1962) ; and Fulwood v.
Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962). And prior to Winston, a steady trickle of cases
marking the beginning of a trend away from the hands-off doctrine had come from state
and federal courts. See generally Comment, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: Tile De-
veloping Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1962).
4. This phrase is taken from Fritch, Civil Rights of Federal Prison Inmates 31 (1961)
(Document prepared for the Federal Bureau of Prisons.).
5. Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954).
6. It has sometimes been phrased in these terms. See, e.g., Dayton v. Hunter, 176 F.2d
108 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 888 (1950). For other formulations of the doe-
trine see note 12 infra.
7. The implications of this are discussed in detail at text accompanying notes 118-23
infra.
COMPLAINTS OF CONVICTS
Confinement in an institution which must provide for the custody, maintenance,
discipline, and rehabilitation of men who have violated legislative norms in-
volves still greater forfeitures. And confinement in an institution which has
been allotted limited resources to fulfill conflicting functions with imperfect
knowledge, deficient facilities, and an inadequate staff will involve still further
privation. To the extent that the hands-off doctrine prevents review of those
deprivations which are inevitable concomitants of prison life, it would seem to
be an efficient method of disposing of prisoners' complaints. And if all petitions
from legally committed prisoners could be assumed to contest only those de-
privations which are the necessary concomitant of confinement in a penal in-
stitution, then an examination of the allegations contained in such petitions
would be an exercise in futility that is well avoided.
Prisoners, however, may suffer other kinds of deprivations which are not
a necessary result of the institutional structure of prisons but rather are at-
tributable to arbitrary and capricious decisions by prison officials or to un-
duly restrictive regulations.8 This other category of deprivations has also been
held to be non-reviewable under the rubric of the hands-off doctrine. Although
a few courts recently have departed from the doctrine, notably in situations
where invasions of highly preferred interests such as religion were involved,9
a general attempt to sort out those deprivations which are a necessary conse-
quence of prison life from those which are not has yet to occur. For the
hands-off doctrine precludes an examination of even the allegations of a com-
plaint and thus prevents a determination of whether the prisoner has pre-
sented a claim warranting relief. In relying upon the hands-off doctrine, all that
a court in effect determines is that the complainant is a legally convicted prisoner.
It then follows that his grievance is beyond the ken of judicial authority or
competence. As a result, prisoners are left without enforceable rights.
A few courts have refused to allow this result; rather they have adopted
a principle quite at odds with this consequence of the hands-off doctrine: "A
prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or
by necessary implication, taken from him by law."' 0 On those occasions when
courts have adopted this counter principle, they have either expressly or by
implication rejected the hands-off doctrine. This is hardly surprising, for un-
less this counter-principle is to be anything more than a pious declaration,
some form of judicial review and at times relief is indeed necessary.
Past commentaries on the civil rights of prisoners have addressed them-
selves primarily to a description of the traditional remedies available: habeas
corpus, proceedings under the Federal Civil Rights Act, tort suits against
either prison officials or the State." There is substantial agreement that these
8. See discussion of the implications of abandoning the hands-off doctrine at tiext ac-
companying notes 97-270 infra.
9. See discussion of deprivations of religious freedom at text accompanying notes 159-
81 infra.
10. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).
11. Comment, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA.
L. REv. 985 (1962) ; Comment, Federal Remedies for Lawfully Committed Prisoners Who
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remedies have been of little practical utility. The courts' failure to grant relief
with any degree of consistency cannot generally be attributed to the internal
doctrinal limitations of the remedies. Rather, it appears to stem from a con-
viction held with virtual unanimity by the courts 1 2 that it is beyond their power
to review the internal management of the prison system.1 3 The reason under-
lying refusal to review the administrative decisions of prison officials is the
Claim Mistreatment, 2 J. PuB. L. 181 (1953); Note, Habeas-Corpus-Corain Nobis-
Remedies Avdilable to Validly Sentenced Prisoners Who Are Mistreated by State Penal
Authorities, 33 NEB. L. REy. 434 (1954); Tappan, The Legal Rights of Prisoners, 293
ANNALs 99 (1954) ; Widdifield, The State Convict (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation in Yale
Law School Library) ; Note, Denial of Prisoners' Claims Under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 63 YALE L.J. 418 (1954) ; Note, Prisoners' Remedies for Mistreatment, 59 YALE L.J.
800 (1950); I EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
79-83 (2d ed. 1958).
12. Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954).
Variants on this particular formulation of the hands-off doctrine include: "it is not within
the province of the courts," it re Taylor, 187 F.2d 852, 853 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 955 (1951) ; "it is not the function of the courts," Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951) ; "courts have no supervisory jurisdiction
over the conduct of the various institutions," Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276, 278 (8th Cir.
1951) ; "a court does not have power ... to superintend," Sturm v. McGrath, 177 F.2d
472, 473 (10th Cir. 1949) ; "a court has no power ... to superintend," Dayton v. Hunter,
176 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 888 (1950) ; "it is not (the district
court's] province to supervise prison, discipline," Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986, 987 (9th
Cir. 1948) ; "courts do not have the power and it is not their function or responsibility,"
Curtis v. Jacques, 130 F. Supp. 920, 921 (W.D. Mich. 1954). For similar pronouncements
from other federal courts see, e.g., United States ex rel. Collins v. Heinze, 219 F.2d 233
(9th Cir. 1955) ; Henson v. Welch, 199 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1952) ; Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d
483 (5th Cir. 1952); Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952) ; Powell v. Hunter,
172 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1949) ; Sarshik v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1944) ; United
States ex rel. Vraniak v. Randolph, 161 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ill. 1958) ; United States ex
rel. Bowe v. Skeen, 107 F. Supp. 879 (N.D. W. Va. 1952) ; Peretz v. Humphrey, 86 F.
Supp. 706 (M.D. Pa. 1949) ; and Feyerchak v. Hiatt, 7 F.R.D. 726 (M.D. Pa. 1948). This
doctrine is by no means limited to federal courts and federal prisons but is uniformly adopted
by state courts. See, e.g., Edmondson v. Warden of Maryland House of Detention, 194 Md.
707, 69 A.2d 919 (1949) ; State ex rel. Renner v. Wright, 188 Md. 189, 51 A.2d 668 (1947) ;
Wetzel v. Wiggins, 226 Miss. 671, 84 So. 2d 795 (1956) ; Dunn v. Jones, 150 Neb. 669, 35
N.W.2d 673 (1949) ; People v. Collins, 200 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1960) ; Commonwealth ex rel.
Smith v. Banmiller, 194 Pa. Super. 566, 168 A.2d 793 (1962) ; and Commonwealth ex rel.
Thompson v. Day, 182 Pa. Super. 644, 128 A.2d 133 (1956).
13. Commentators have not considered this to be the central problem. That is the thesis
of this paper. But see Note, Habeas Corpus-Coram Nobis-Remedies Available to Validly
Sentenced Prisoners Who Are Mistreated by State Penal Authorities, 33 NEn. L. Rv. 434,
439 (1954), where this reason is referred to in- passing as the courts' "favorite" excuse for
denying relief. And the most recent commentary, Comment, Constitutional Rights of Pris-
oners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985, 986-87 (1962), observes:
[A] study of the cases involving alleged mistreatment indicates that the courts have
been so influenced by the dogma of the independence of prison authorities that judicial
intervention has been limited to the extreme situation. Some courts have even stated




unquestioning acceptance by courts of the assertion repeatedly made that
judicial review of such administrative decisions will subvert the authority
of prison officials, the discipline of the prisons, and the efforts of prison ad-
ministrators to accomplish the objectives of the system which is entrusted to
their care and management.' 4 If this assertion is true, then the overwhelming
body of case law in this area is probably correct in its refusal to pass on the
merits of an inmate's claims. But if the truth of this proposition is questionable,
or lacking in empirical substantiation, then there is a denonstrable need for
the courts to reconsider the premise on which they have consistently relied in
denying relief. This Comment will examine the hands-off doctrine by a
consideration of (1) its effect upon the legal remedies of prisoners, (2) tile
rationales advanced to support it, and (3) the possible implications of abandon-
ing it.
AVAILABLE REMEDIES FOR PRISONERS-THEORETICAL LImiTs AND
P1RAc1icAL EFFICACY
Habeas Corpus: Courts are coming to view the Great Writ as a remedial
writ with inherent flexibility and adaptability. As Judge Learned Hand pointed
out:
We can find no more definite rule than that the writ is available, not only
to determine points of jurisdiction, stricti juris, and constitutional ques-
tions; but whenever else resort to it is necessary to prevent a complete
miscarriage of justice.15
14. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee, pp. 5-6, Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. ,VFEK 3183 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1962) (No. 464):
These prisoners, of course, have been segregated from society because of their anti-
social acts, and it is the responsibility of the Bureau of Prisons to provide for their
proper government, treatment, care, rehabilitation and reformation. It is obvious,
however, that these objectives can only be carried out in an atmosphere where the
authority of the supervisory personnel is respected and discipline is firmly and fairly
administered. But if prisoners are allowed access to the courts to test the wisdom of
the decisions of the administrative personnel, this will undermine that authority by
constantly subjecting these decisions to judicial reexamination.
Thus if appellant's assertion, that prison personnel were negligent in failing to
provide adequate medical care affords him access to the courts under the Torts
Claims Act, it is evident that the prison decisions, orders and conduct which con-
stitute the basis for allegedly negligent supervision would be thrown open to judicial
examinatiom Similar instances of alleged negligence are easy to envision-for ex-
ample, negligence in. requiring a prisoner to do heavy labor, negligence in ordering
a prisoner into solitary confinement, negligence in providing inferior type cleaning
equipment for kitchen work, negligence of a machine shop supervisor in permitting
prisoners to use equipment without proper instruction or equipment in disrepair,
negligence in, not providing adequate or timely medical treatment, and negligence in
not adequately searching the prisoners. Each of these events and many more would
require the administrative regulation, of prison discipline to yield to judicial scrutiny
of the decisions of prison personnel, a condition which "would be prejudicial to the
proper maintenance of discipline. Golub v. Krimsky, 188 F. Supp. 783, 784 (S.D.N.Y.
1960)."
15. United States ex rel. Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811, 813 (2d Cir. 1946), reefd
o ot er grounds, 332 U.S. 174 (1947) (habeas corpus cannot be used where direct appeal
lies). See also Mr. justice Rutledge's dissent, 332 U.S. at 188.
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Three traditional limitations on the availability of the writ have prevented it
from being an effective remedy for prisoners:
(1) the exhaustion of remedies rule;1 (2) the proposition that the only
relief which can be granted under the writ is total release;17 and (3) the re-
striction that the writ is only available to contest the legitimacy of one's con-
finement and is not available to test the legitimacy of the mode or manner of
confinement.' 8
The exhaustion of remedies rule, while it imposes no limitation on the type
of situation for which the writ may issue, constitutes a significant procedural
barrier for prisoners seeking relief from the courts. Prisoners in the federal
penal system will have to exhaust the remedies established by the Federal
Bureau of Prisons before becoming eligible for the writ. 10 State prisoners must
exhaust state administrative remedies (if such exist) to be eligible for the writ
in state courts and must exhaust their remedies in the state courts before
becoming eligible to petition a federal court for the writ.20 This exhaustion of
remedies rule is an extremely salutory one where adequate administrative
remedies exist. But it should be noted that this rule tends to preclude success-
ful use of federal habeas corpus by any person serving a short term in a
state prison. Case studies of the instances where remedy under the writ has
been granted by federal courts to state prisoners show that nearly all success-
ful applicants were inmates convicted for serious crimes and serving long
sentences. 21 If the only applicants most likely to become entitled to petition for
the federal writ under the exhaustion of remedies rule are the most dangerous
felons such as murderers or armed robbers, it is understandable that the courts
which accept the second limitation-that the only remedy available is total re-
lease-would be unwilling to grant the writ.
The exhaustion of state remedies rule has been somewhat restricted by the
statutory exception embodied in section 2254 of the Judicial Code which per-
mits the federal courts to hear a habeas corpus petition from a state prisoner
who has not exhausted his state remedies "when there is either an absence of
available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering
such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.12 2 To the extent
that adequate remedial safeguards are lacking for prisoners wishing to chal-
lenge deprivations, this provision fills a most important need. Thus, in United
16. Johnson, v. Dye, 338 U.S. 864 (1949) (per curiam). See Note, Prisoners' Remnedies
for Afistreatntent, 59 YALE L.J. 800 (1950).
17. See, e.g., Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952) ; Snow v. Roche, 143 F.2d
718 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 788 (1944) ; Note, Prisoners' Remedies for Mistreat-
inent, supra note 16, at 805 n22.
18. Ibid.
19. Cf. note 16 supra. See also court's mention of the prisoner's mail box as a form of
remedy in Lowe v. Hiatt, 77 F. Supp. 303 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
20. See note 16 supra.
21. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Post Conviction Remedy for State Prisoners 108
U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1960).
22. 28 U.S.C. 2254 (1958).
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States ex rel. Marcial v. Fay, 3 this provision was used to grant relief where
state remedies were not exhausted but the petitioner wras without financial
ability to proceed further.
Gradual inroads are also being made upon the courts' insistence that habeas
corpus may be used only to deliver an inmate from custody.2 4 In two recent
cases, the writ was granted where the remedy was not release of the inmate,
but rather his transfer to another institution. Coffin v. Reichard 25 illustrates
the most dramatic departure from the traditional limitation on remedy in
habeas corpus proceedings. There the court adopted a broad construction of
its statutory authority to use the writ "as law and justice require" and re-
manded the petitioner to prison with direction to the authorities to respect
his civil rights.
With gradual erosion of the first two limitations taking place, the major
obstacle remaining to use of the writ by prisoners as a means of challenging de-
privations imposed during detention is the principle that the writ is only avail-
able to challenge the legality of the conviction. The primary impediment to
eliminating this third limitation is the hands-off doctrine. Courts will not use
habeas corpus to examine the mode of confinement since "it is not within the
power of the courts to supervise the management of the prison system."20
Those cases which have utilized habeas corpus to review the mode or manner of
confinement 2 -, and to grant remedies other than release are cases which have
rejected the hands-off doctrine and the considerations underlying it. Coffin v.
Reichardas mentioned above for the unique remedy granted, also illustrates
that courts can under habeas corpus review allegations of mistreatment in
prison. Significantly, this is the case which enunciates the counter principle
to the hands-off doctrine. And in a recent case where habeas corpus was
granted to a prisoner transferred without notice or hearing from a state peni-
tentiary to an institution for insane prisoners, the court explicitly rejected the
considerations of administrative discretion which underlie the hands-off doc-
trine, stating that the "State's right to detain a prisoner is entitled to no
greater application than its correlative duty to protect him from unlawful and
23. 247 F2d 662 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 915 (1958). See also United
States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, 300 F2d 345 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sb nort. Fay v. Noia,
369 U.S. 869 (1962).
24. See Justice Black's statement in Dowd v. United States ex rc. Cook, 340 U.S. 205,
209-10 (1951) set in a more traditional habeas corpus context, wherein the petitioner was
granted the intermediate remedy of a right of appeal rather than release:
There remains the question of the disposition to be made of this case. Fortunately,
we are not confronted with the dilemma envisaged by the State of having to choose
between ordering an absolute discharge of the prisoner and denying him all relief.
The District Court has power in a habeas corpus proceeding to "dispose of the
matter as law and justice require."
25. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
26. See cases cited in note 12 supra.
27. See, e.g., In re Ferguson 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417 (1961) (dictum), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 864 (1961) ; In re Chessman, 44 Cal. 2d 1, 279 P.2d 24 (1955) ; In re Rider, 50
Cal. App. 787, 195 Pac. 965 (Dist. Ct. App. 1920).
28. See note 25 supra.
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onerous treatment. '29 It seems clear that until the hands-off doctrine is dis-
carded, there is little hope that habeas corpus will be an effective remedial
writ for prisoners seeking either redress for or protection against deprivations
suffered in prison.
Proceedings under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Sections 1983 and 1985 (3)
of the Federal Civil Rights Act3 o enable persons deprived of certain rights to
sue for civil damages or to obtain injunctive relief in the federal courts. Section
1983 applies where the alleged injury is caused by a person acting under color
of any law, regulation or custom of any state or territory. Section 1985 (3) ap-
plies to conspiracies to deprive persons of certain rights. The only rights pro-
tected by these provisions are rights secured by the Constitution or federal
statutes against state or individual action. 1 It is well established that un-
justified violence by a state official amounting to denial of due process of law
constitutes grounds for action under these provisions. 2 In four cases, the
courts have held that an allegation of mistreatment by a prison official stated a
cause of action under the Civil Rights Act.3 And other recent cases involving
allegations of differential treatment due to petitioner's religion further establish
the potential scope and potency of this remedy for prisoners.3 4
Despite the potential effectiveness of the Civil Rights Act indicated by such
cases, there is a notable tendency on the part of courts to construe the sub-
stantive rights narrowly and to utilize two techniques for denying relief to
inmates bringing actions under these provisions. First, the courts have de-
clared in a number of cases involving allegations of such things as brutal mis-
treatment, unwarranted solitary confinement, censorship of mails, and prison
mismanagement that because of considerations of federalism it is not the func-
ion of the federal courts to supervise the state penal systems.33 Thus, state prison-
ers must seek relief in the state courts, which courts also deny relief on the
principle that it is not within their power to supervise prison administration. 0
Second, even where the courts have not denied a federal forum to state prison-
29. People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 174 N.E.2d 725, 726, 215
N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (1961).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1958).
31. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (dictum); I EMERSON & -ADm,
PorrrIcAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 81 (2d ed. 1958).
32. See, e.g., Geach v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Picking v. Pet. R.R,,
151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945).
33. Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957); McCollum v. Mayfield, 130
F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. I11. 1948).
Contra, United States ex reL. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 964 (1957) ; Ortega v. Rageh, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
940 (1955) ; Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950).
34. Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196
(4th Cir. 1961).
35. See, e.g., Swanson v. McGuire, 188 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ill. 1960); United States
ex rel. Atterbury v. Rager supra note 33; Siegel v. Ragen, supra note 33 ;.see also cases
cited in United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, supra.
36. See note 12 supra.
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ers, they have denied relief by drawing on the vast body of habeas corpus cases
which declare that nearly all deprivations inflicted on prisoners are matters
of internal prison management and not subject to review by the courts.U7
Tort actions:38 The efficacy of this remedy has been succinctly stated by
one commentator:
... A tort action against responsible state officials is the principal form of
legal redress. But this action affords only restricted relief: frequently
statutes prevent convicts from suing; potential defendants are protected
by the doctrines of sovereign immunity and administrative discretion;
and recovery on the merits is difficult even when suit is possible.3 0
While actions against individual jailers have long been permitted,4 0 tort ac-
tions against the United States have been barred by the overwhelming body
of precedent to the effect that the congressional waiver of sovereign immunity
embodied in the Federal Tort Claims Act does not extend to prisoners.4 One
of the principal reasons given for refusing to apply the Federal Tort Claims
Act to federal prisoners is that permitting prisoners to bring such suits would
have detrimental effects on discipline and would involve the courts in adminis-
tration of the prison system 42 This is, of course, a rationale given for the
hands-off doctrine.
Furthermore, even if the Federal Tort Claims Act is henceforth held to apply
to prisoners, the power.of the hands-off doctrine to curtail the effectiveness of
the tort remedy has not been destroyed. The waiver of immunity contained in
this act expressly excepts claims based on discretionary acts.43 Nearly every
37. See, e.g., Wilson v. Dixon, 251 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d
483 (5th Cir. 1952). See also note 35 supra. Cases cited therein rely on this second rationale
also.
38. Disabilities stemming from sovereign immunity and civil death statutes lie outside
the scope of this piece which deals with deprivations resulting from the actions and decisions
of prison officials. However, for federal prisoners neither of these disabilities exists. See
Note, Denial of Prisoners' Clains Under the Federal Tort Clahns Act, 63 Y=aI L.J. 418
(1954).
39. Note, Prisoners' Remedies for Mistreatment, 59 YALE LJ. 800, 801 (1950).
40. See, e.g., Hill v. Gentry, 280 F.2d 88 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 875
(1960) ; State of Indiana ex rel. Tyler v. Gobin, 94 Fed. 48 (C.C.D. Ind. 1899) ; Magen-
heimer v. State cx rel. Dalton, 120 Ind. App. 128, 90 N.E.2d 813 (1950) ; Smith v. Miller,
241 Iowa 625, 40 N.V.2d 597 (1950) ; O'Dell v. Goodsell, 149 Neb. 261, 30 N.NV.2d 906
(1948) ; Hixon v. Cupp, 5 Okla. 545, 49 P. 927 (1897) ; Kusah v. McCorkle, 100 Wash.
318, 170 Pac. 1023 (1918).
41. See cases cited in Judge Kaufman's dissent, Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d
253,258 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. ,VEnx 3183 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1962) (No. 464).
42. Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906, 910 (W.D. Va. 1953); Note, Denial
of Prisonrers" Clainms Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 YAu L.J. 418 (1954).
43. The issue of discretionary versus ministerial was not argued by the government
in the Winston and Muniz cases, but it is easy to see how the following statement, which
was directed toward the issue of extending the FTCA to prisoners, could be turned into an
argument to demonstrate that the injury resulted from a discretionary and not a ministerial
act:
In the Winston brief, we emphasized the deleterious effects upon prison discipline
and, hence security, that would result if actions were allowed to be brought for pris-
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decision or action by a prison official has been held to be a matter of internal
prison management not subject to review by courts. Cases so holding may be
used, albeit out of context,44 as precedent for dismissing many tort claims ol
the ground that they result from discretionary actions and thus are still barred
by sovereign immunity. Thus, the applicability of the Federal Tort Claims Act
and its state counterparts and the effectiveness of the tort remedy in general
will in large part depend on the weight which the courts give to the hands-off
doctrine and to the reasons advanced in support of it.
Mandamus: In In the Matter of Brown v. McGinnis,"rs an inmate brought an
action in the nature of mandamus to compel the Commissioner of Correction of
New York to permit petitioner free exercise of his religion. The New York
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's dismissal of this proceeding and in
effect directed the Commissioner to issue rules and regulations which would ex-
tend to the petitioner his religious rights subject to considerations of security and
discipline.40 Here, as in proceedings under the Federal Civil Rights Act, the
court began with the counter rule stated earlier, which places the presumption in
favor of the retention of all the rights of an ordinary citizen:
Petitioner is entitled to the rights conferred upon him by the Constitu-
tion and section 610 of the Correction Law, subject to their limitations
and reasonable rules and regulations of the Commissioner of Correction. 47
At present, there is insufficient case law dealing with internal prison manage-
ment under this remedy to provide a basis for evaluating its possible utility.
Further, Brown is a case from which it is dangerous to generalize, because it
arises under a specific statute guaranteeing some degree of religious freedom
to prisoners. As with the other remedies, the scope of mandamus proceedings as
an effective remedy for prisoners will depend on whether or not the courts
are willing to abandon the hands-off doctrine.
on-incurred injuries allegedly due to the negligence of prison supervisory personnel
.... In the instant case, this effect is brought into even sharper focus. For here, the
negligence alleged, i.e., a failure to provide sufficient guards, inadequate classifica-
tion and segregation of prisoners and the procedure of locking prisoners itn cottages
upon the outbreak of a riot directly challenges the security procedures of the prison,
And if the decisions affecting these most fundamental aspects of prison responsi-
bility are subject to judicial review, then it is obvious that the result will be inimical
to effective discipline and thus to the maintenance of security. Similarly, exposing
these decisions to judicial review ... cannot be squared with the congressional man-
date entrusting the management of the federal prison system to the Bureau of Prisons.
Brief for Appellee, pp. 3-4, Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
granted, 31 U.S.L. WEE 3183 (U.S. Dec. 3, 1962) (No. 464).
44. These cases stand only for the proposition, that the prison. system is entrusted to
the Attorney General (or equivalent state official) and therefore its management is a matter
of administrative discretion over which the courts have no jurisdiction. These decisions have
no logical bearing on the issue of discrctionary versus ininistcrial once the courts do assume
jurisdiction over the subject matter. For a discussion of considerations relevant to the isste
of what is discretionary in this second sense, see text accompanying notes 219-27 hnfra.
45. 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E.2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962).
46. See Chief Judge Desmond's concurring opinion making this point explicit. Id. at
536, 180 N.E.2d at 793, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
47. Id. at 536, 180 N.E.2d at 793, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 501.
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CRITIQUE OF THE HANDS-OFF DOCTINE
The Conferral of Authority Argument: In ruling that an inmate's com-
plaint lies beyond the scope of judicial review, courts invariably advance a ra-
tionale based on a quasi-"separation of powers" argument.48 The formulation
found in federal court opinions is almost always identical:
The prison system is under the administration of the Attorney General
... and not of the district courts. The court has no power to interfere
with the conduct of the prison or its discipline.4 9
A similar argument based on relevant state statutes is advanced by state
courts.8 0 At this level of abstraction, the rationale seems somewhat circular:
administrative decisions made by duly appointed authorities are not subject
to judicial review because they are administrative decisions and are therefore
not subject to judicial review. If there is one principle which emerges from a
consideration of the instances where courts have considered the question whether
the action of an official is unreviewable, it is that non-reviewability cannot be
automatically inferred from the fact that authority has been delegated. Even
where the delegation of authority is coupled with the legislative statement that
all decisions are final, judicial review has not been held to be entirely pre-
cluded. 51 Not only can it be said that delegation does not entail non-reviewability,
but the contrary can be asserted in terms of a presumption in favor of re-
viewability:
The decisions of the past two or three decades fit reasonably well the
idea of a presumption of reviewability that may be rebutted by affirma-
tive indication of legislative intent in favor of unreviewability, or by some
special reason for unreviewability growing out of the subject matter or the
circumstances. Although the opinions have not expressly formulated the
presumption, the Supreme Court, in absence of adequate rebuttal of the
presumption, has in recent decades held reviewable [a variety of official
determinations] .52
The one federal court that has expressly faced the question of whether dele-
gation of authority for the management of the prison system necessarily in-
volves immunity from review has explicitly rejected this rationale of the
hands-off doctrine:
One point, however, the government presses here more assiduously
than in Winston: that a damage action by a prisoner subjects to judicial
48. This justification of the hands-off doctrine is discussed first, even though it may
seem like a make weight, because it appears consistently as the courts' articulated rationale.
Presumably, there is a functional basis for the conferral but that is treated later in a separate
discussion of the extent to which review would seriously endanger the fulfillment of penal
objectives.
49. Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1949).
50. See note 12 stpra.
51. See, e.g., Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 119-20 (1946) and see critical dis-
cussion of the dramatic extent to which the Supreme Court interpreted the "shall be final"
language of the Draft Act in 4 DAvis, ADmINISTRATIVE LAw T .ATxsE § 28.12 at 62-65
(1958) [hereinafter cited as DAvIs]. See generally 4 DAvIs §§ 28.10-28.15
52. 4 DAVIs § 28.07, at 31 (1958).
19631
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
determination acts exclusively within the competence and authority of the
Bureau of Prisons, under the direction of the Attorney General ....
That section 53 does indeed charge the Bureau with "management and
regulation of all Federal penal and correctional institutions"; it imposes
the duty to "provide .. .for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of
all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States,
or held as witnesses or otherwise"; and to "provide for the protection,
instruction, and discipline of all persons charged with or convicted of
offenses against the United States."
But a mere grant of authority cannot be taken as a blanket waiver of
responsibility in its execution. Numerous federal agencies are vested with
extensive administrative responsibilities. But it does not follow that their
actions are immune from judicial review.54
In the particular context of prisoners' rights, the conferral argument appears
particularly weak when utilized to prevent continued supervision by the
judiciary of those very persons whom it has consigned to the prisons under
terms it has formulated. 55
The Frustration of Penal Objectives Argument: Underlying the conferral
of authority rationale is the basic fear which impels the courts to refuse to
supervise the internal operations of the prisons, namely, that permitting ju-
dicial review of administrative decisions would impair the ability of prison
officials to carry out the objectives of the penal system."0 An analysis of this
functional justification for the hands-off doctrine must begin by asking in
what way judicial review would interfere with the realization of certain goals.
The following discussion will attempt to set forth some of the possible effects
of judicial review on the effectuation of the traditional objectives of the penal
system: retribution, restraint, rehabilitation, and deterrence. The discussion
does not deal with the question of whether administrative review in some in-
stances would be preferable to judicial review. It is only concerned with the
contention that review per se would be deleterious.
1. Retribution: In our society, the retributive function of the criminal law,
while frequently disclaimed, finds effectuation in a number of ways, some
statutory 57 and some administrative. 58 It is difficult to tell how much of a
53. 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1958).
54. Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285, 286-87 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 31
U.S.L. WEEK 3183 (Dec. 4, 1962) (No. 464).
55. This kind of follow-up responsibility has been acknowledged in a few instances by
courts. See, e.g., People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215
N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961); United States v. Garcia, reprinted in DONNELLY, GohUsTEmI &
SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW 382-87 (1962) [hereinafter cited as DONNELLY ET AL,.. See
also Carter, The Offender Who Violates Both State and Federal Law, 26 F.R.D. 355, 358-
59, 361-63 (1959).
56. See note 43 supra; Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953).
See also notes 12, 14 vtpra.
57. The statutory manifestations of retribution such as minimum terms for certain
offenses, civil death, loss of civil rights and capital punishment lie outside the scope of thils
Comment.
58. See, e.g., statement of J. V. Bennett, Director, U.S. Bureau of Prisons:
[Vol, 72: 506
COMPLAINTS OF CONVICTS
retributive component underlies the many deprivations imposed on prisoners
in penal institutions upon which courts have refused to pass under the hands-
off doctrine. Many of the deprivations undergone are justified in terms of
administrative convenience and financial feasibility. However, the weight which
is accorded to factors of administrative convenience and financial expediency
is in no small measure a function of the retributive principle that a man who
has violated a law is not entitled to as much of society's resources and con-
sideration as the non-offender.59 Thus retribution may well lie behind the
oft-quoted passage from Price v. Johnston:60
Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation
of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system.61
Without a retributive principle implemented through assigning a lower priority
to the needs of miscreants, a radically different result might follow.0 2 One
might reason that those who violate the law are likely to need greater and more
intensive care than other groups in society.03 To the extent that society has
accepted a need criterion in funneling resources to those least able to cope with
urban, industrial life-dependent children, the aged, and the unemployed-
we might expect that but for the retributive concept of "moral desert," con-
sistency with that need principle would imply its application to the criminal. 0
Most judges.., send men and a few women to prison to be corrected, to be re-
directed, to be rehabilitated--call it what you will. And they send them there as
punishment and not primarily for punishment.
Bennett, Address before the American Law Institute, Washington, D.C., May 20, 1954,
reprinted in DONELLY Er. AL. 401. This statement reveals, as well as any, the ambivalence
of our avowed correctional philosophy. For ar even more overt indication see the statement
from People v. Russell, 245 Ill. 268, 91 N.E. 1075 (1910), quoted with seeming approval
in Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1950):
[The prisoner] has become an alien in his own, country, and worse, for he can be
restored only as a matter of grace, while an alien may acquire citizenship as a mat-
ter of right.
59. See Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285 (D. Alaska 1951) ; Vinston v. United
States, 305 F.2d 253, 277 n.9 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. AVEnK 3183 (U.S. Dec.
4, 1962) (No. 464).
60. 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
61. Id. at 285.
62. Sykes points out that we have been notably unwilling to experiment with the old
tradition of Danegelt (a form of tribute money paid to obtain the desistance of those who
posed a menace to societal norms). Srus, THE SocI-r? oF Cnrvas 11 n.5 (1958) [here-
inafter cited as SYxEs].
63. This notion seems to have been adopted by Dession in his definition of "positive
sanction," and his espousal of the principal that "where a situation ... can be corrected by
a positive sanction, such measure shall be preferred [to a negative or depriving sanction.]"
Professor George H. Dession's Final Draft of the Code of Correct ion for Puerto Rico, 71
YALE L.J. 1050, 1079, 1117-18 (1962).
64. One experimenter in the field of juvenile delinquency has achieved significant re-
suits by reversing the traditional flow of money from patient to therapist when therapy is
initiated at the therapist's insistence rather than upon the patient's request. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 5, 1962, § 1, p. 1, col. 2, p. 42, col. 1. This experiment was also described in an address
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The aspect of retribution which most noticeably permeates prison life and
shapes many of the administrative policies is the silent "doing-time" com-
pact between society, the prisoner, and the prison officials.05 Under this com-
pact, one is in jail to "pay one's debt to society" and the more submissively and
quietly the debt is paid, the more quickly are retribution's demands satisfied.00
The many deprivations which are exacted in the name of administrative discre-
tion might then be viewed as part of the repayment which society requires.
To cause administrative inconvenience, to question the authority and judg-
ment of those charged with exacting the eye for an eye might seem totally in-
consistent with fulfillment of the retributive objectives of the penal sys-
tem; therefore, it would appear that judicial review of discretionary deci-
sions by prison officials could only interfere with the efficient exaction of re-
tribution.
There is, however, one important aspect of the retributive doctrine which
has important implications for the function of judicial review in the penal
system. The very notion of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" involves
certain concepts of limitation, of just desert, 7 which are best summed tip in
an object which both the Mikado and the warden of Sing-Sing 08 share in com-
mon: "to let the punishment fit the crime." If each crime against the state brings
into being a debt of a certain magnitude which the offender must then repay,
the deprivation which he undergoes must be fixed to correspond with the debt.
Sentences which are graded according to the seriousness of the offense are
nothing but the price tags which society puts on certain kinds of actions. It
follows that if we cannot permit convicts to go free without paying their "full
debt to society," so too, it would be inequitable to exact from them a greater de-
by Dr. Donald Cook, Professional Service Staff, Nat. Inst. of Mental Health (now Research
Director, Basic Systems, Inc.):
With the recognition that referrals to clinics were not picking up the delinquency
prone population, the various programs of "reaching out" began, to develop .... In
other words, the therapist, not the patient, is the supplicant in recruitment ....
That is the technique developed by Charles Slack at Harvard for recruiting his tar-
get individuals: he pays them. I want merely to point out that this step is a logical
development of the "reaching out" trend, and to suggest that much of the furor which
his work has brought forth springs from the clear reversal of the flow of money
and its implications for conventional professional status patterns. For where referral
reverses its direction and becomes recruitment, the norms of a private practice pro-
fession can no longer apply.
Cook, Paper given at Symposium orr delinquency, American Psychological Association
Conference, Chicago, Sept. 1960 (copy on file in Yale Law Library).
65. Yablonsky, Correction and the "Doing-Time" Society, 24 FED. PRoD. 55 (March,
1960).
66. Id. at 56.
67. The most persuasive presentation of this position is to be found in C. S. Lewis, The
Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 RES. JUDICATAE 224 (1953), reprinted hi, DoN-
NELLY, ET AL. 499 (1962).




privation than their offense warrants. 69 Presumably, it is this reasoning which in
part underlies the proscription of cruel and unusual punishment,70 and similarly
it is this reasoning which should compel limited judicial review of the mode of
imprisonment. Under the retributive doctrine, the limits of sentences are fixed
by the legislature and the specific deprivations are set by the courts with what
might be termed an expectation of "reasonable deprivation."7' Deviation from
this standard of customary deprivation means that society is exacting a more
(or less) serious penalty than the offense warrants. Thus, it seems reasonable
to provide some form of review to insure that the customary level of deprivation
upon which the sentence's length was predicated is maintained. And this in
turn will require judicial supervision of the penal system at certain critical
points. First, if a man were sentenced to a minimum security prision or reha-
bilitative center for a certain number of years 72 and shortly after confinement
was then transferred without cause to a maximum security prison where the
deprivation was much more severe or if the prisoner consigned to prison was,
without any procedure for administrative review or right of appeal, sent to a
mental institution, courts acting in furtherance of the retributive principle should
intervene. Such deprivations seem in excess of that upon which the sentence was
predicated. Such was the reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals in People
ex rel. Brown v. Johnston 73 where the petitioner was transferred from the
penitentiary to the state institution for insane prisoners:
... [I]t seems quite obvious that any further restraint in excess of that
permitted by the judgment or constitutional guarantees should be subject
to inquiry.7 4
69. See, e.g., Ex parte Allen, 86 Okla. Crim. 48, 192 P.2d 289 (1948), cerl. denied, 334
U.S. 830 (1948); People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 4&9, 174 N.E.2A 725, 215
N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961).
70. This is less obviously so of the cruel and unusual punishment part of the amend-
ment than of the "excessive bail" and "excessive fines" portion. Conceivably the cruel and
unusual punishment clause could act as a limit on the principle of paying one's full debt to
society where the crime itself was "cruel and unusual." Nonetheless, the context established
by the amendment as a whole indicates that the principle of punishment commemsurate with
crime underlies the "cruel and unusual" clause as well. And indeed such a construction
appears to have been given the phrase in Robinson v. California, - U.S. -, 82 S. Ct. 1417
(1962). See especially Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring at 1425: "A punishment out of all
proportion to the offense may bring it within the ban, against 'cruel and unusual punish-
ment."
71. See note 55 mpra. Some such distinction may underlie the courts' opinions in Ful-
wood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962) and in Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d
196 (4th Cir. 1961).
72. Within limits prescribed by the legislature, courts have the power to designate the
type of institution to which a prisoner is sent. See, e.g., Banghart v. Swope, 175 F.2d 442
(9th Cir. 1949) ; People v. Santanello, 1 App. Div. 2d 891, 149 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1956) ; Ex
parte Neighbors, 85 Okla. Crim. 183, 187 P.2d 276 (1947). The machinery for presentence
investigations in the federal courts which can be used to determine the most suitable type of
institution is provided by FED. R. Camn. P. 32.
73. 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961).
74. Id. at 485, 174 N.E.2d at 726, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 45,
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The right to contest any increase in deprivation over that originally deemed
adequate thus appears to be an important corollary of the retributive system.
Unless proper administrative procedures are provided, the courts should in-
tervene, rather than abstain, in order to assure the realization of the objective
of retribution. Other unforeseeable and extreme deprivations should similarly
be given administrative or judicial remedy if equitable retribution is to be
exacted.7" To deny a prisoner any recovery for injuries resulting from the un-
lawful actions of prison authorities would similarly appear to be a refusal to
recompense an exaction of payment in excess of the debt owed. To effectuate
the doctrine of retribution, some form of remedy must be provided-whether
administrative or judicial-and some means of review and hearing must be
given to a prisoner's assertion that the remedy is non-existent or inadequate.Y'
Such, it would appear, are the minimal mandates imposed on the prison sys-
tem by the canons of retribution.
2. Restraint. Prison officials have generally assigned high priority to the
objective of restraint, which includes both custody and internal discipline.
Objections to judicial review of internal prison policy have focused on the
detrimental effect on custody and discipline which would result from con-
ferring on inmates the power to challenge authority by appeal to the courts.
Some critics of the penal system contend that the precautions taken in
prisons to prevent escapes and maintain discipline indicate a paranoid pre-
occupation with the possibility of disorder or escapes. 78 However, it seems
unlikely that courts are going to meddle with an assignment of priorities which
so mirrors society's intense fear of escapees and society's desire to forget about
the existence of certain human beings during the period of their "banish-
ment."70 Because the warden of an institution has no way of predicting with
any degree of accuracy which of all his prisoners is the one which will attempt
an escape, it is not surprising that the prison officials have chosen the course of
treating all inmates as if they were serious threats to the task of custody;
stringent security measures are imposed on the entire inmate population with
75. The courts have declared that an, inmate does not "assume the risk" of employment
in prison and therefore "assumption of risk" is no defense to a suit brought for industrial
injuries by an inmate. Melton v. State, 198 Misc. 654, 99 N.Y.S.2d. 737 (Ct. Cl. 1950),
appeal dismnissed, 108 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1951) ; Revelant v. State, 165 Misc. 798, 300 N.Y.S.
1186 (Ct. Cl. 1937). It is submitted that all prison accidents are a species of industrial
accident and that the no "assumption of risk" rationale should apply to all prison accidents
whether incurred during "work" or during another equally mandatory activity or routine.
See text accompanying notes 214-27 infra.
76. Conceivably, the right could comprehend access to law books, time to draw tip
petitions and all the ancillary rights necessary to guarantee access to the courts. And al-
leged infringement of these "rights of preparation" could also be subjected to judicial
scrutiny. See discussion accompanying notes 258-68 infra.
77. SYvis 18, 21.
78. Id. at 19, 25.
79. The intensity of our unconscious fear and hostility is at least partially explained
in FRaUD, ON WAR, SEX, AND NEUROsis 272 (1947), reprinted in DONNELLY, ET AL. 347.
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the full realization that much of the effort may be unnecessary.80 To the extent
that foolproof custody is accepted as a primary goal of penal institutions, it
is no wonder that courts are willing to give a carte blanche to prison adminis-
trators. However, it is important to keep in mind that less than twenty five per
cent of men in prison must be confined to maximum security prisons.8 ' Even
if the security-oriented regulations of a prison should not be tampered with by
the courts, it does not necessarily follow that some form of review of the clas-
sification or reclassification of an inmate should not be available.8
With regard to internal security-oriented regulations, it is important to
note that the argument addressed to the courts and adopted by them in their
hands-off doctrine is not an argument in defense of the merits of each security
regulation. Rather, the contention is that the courts should not even pass on
the merits of a prison regulation because the internal operations of the prison
are not subject to judicial review. The objection is not formulated in terms of a
fear that the court will hold a regulation deemed essential to be void; rather,
it is asserted that the mere assumption of jurisdiction over the subject matter
will of itself undermine prison authority and thwart the authorities' efforts to
fulfill the task of custody. By what process would this subversion take place?
The two most obvious possibilities are these: (1) that prisoners, knowing
that they hold this threat within their power, will be emboldened to violate
rules and to subject the authorities to every conceivable form of dilatory
harassment; (2) that a guard, knowing that his discretionary decisions will
ultimately be reviewable by a judge (who may or may not be sympathetic) will
80. Seaching cells for contraband material; repeatedly counting all inmates to insure
that each man is in his appointed place; censoring mail for evidence of escape plans;
inspecting bars, windows, gratings, and other possible escape routes-all are obvious
precautions. The custodians, however, do not stop with these, for they have found to
their bitter knowledge that in a maximum security prison the most innocent-appear-
ing activity may be a symptom of a major breach in the institution's defenses. Pepper
stolen from the mess-hall may be used as a weapon, to be thrown in the eyes of a
guard during a bid for freedom. A prisoner growing a moustache may be acquiring
a disguise to help him elude the police once he has gotten on the other side of the
wall. Extra electrical fixtures in a cell can cause a blown fuse irt a moment of crisis.
A fresh coat of paint in a cell may be used by ar industrious prisoner to cover up
his handiwork when he has cut the bars and replaced the filings with putty.
All of these seemingly innocent acts and many more like them are prohibited,
therefore, by the regulations of the prison. If it is argued that such security measures
are based on relatively rare events, the officials can only agree. They vill add, how-
ever, that prisoners are ingenious in devising ways to escape and it is the duty of the
officials to prevent escapes from occurring.
... To the prison- officials, then- the guards on the wall form the last line of the
institution's defenses, not the first, and they fight their battle at the center of their
position rather than at its perimeter.
SYxs 21, 19.
81. Scudder, The Open Institution, 293 Annals 79 (Mray 1954). At Chino, one of the
first things told a new inmate by the staff is how easy it is to escape. Id. at 82.
See also Svxzs 19.
82. See Note, Reform in Federal Penal Procedure: The Federal Corrections and Parole
Improvement Bills, 53 YA.E L.J. 773 (1944) ; Fn. P. Cm. P. 32(c) (1-2).
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hesitate to act with the decisiveness and flexibility which is necessary to main-
tain order in prison. Underlying these possibilities is the more basic fear, to
be discussed separately, that courts, because they lack understanding and
sympathy for the problem, will invalidate acts and regulations which prison
officials deem essential to restraint.
It seems doubtful that abandonment of the hands-off doctrine would en-
courage prisoners to defy the authorities. 83 The chance of ultimate success in
the courts is not likely to serve as an immediate enough corrective to chnmge
a prisoner's mind as to the wisdom of immediate compliance with regulations.
If redress comes only after weeks or months of disciplinary action, a prisoner
will still think twice before violating a regulation, even one he believes may be
invalid. Further, although the Supreme Court has never ruled on whether a
prisoner contesting the legitimacy of the mode of his confinement can engage
in defiance of prison authority, it was held in Poulos v. New Hampshire 84 that
the unlawfulness of the denial of a permit could not be used as a defense for the
unlawful act of holding public religious services in a park without a license.
Similarly, in Nelson v. United States,8 5 the court held that even though a
prisoner had been illegally imprisoned, this was no defense for his misconduct
in prison. If the rule that one must contest unlawful official acts through
proper channels rather than through defiance applies to Jehovah's Witnesses
and to a prisoner illegally detained, a fortiori, it applies to prisoners who are
contesting the manner of their imprisonment and not its legitimacy.
A similar line of reasoning applies to the "vacillating guard" alternative. In-
dividual guards have long been amenable to suits by prisoners for certain kinds
of misconduct 80 and it is difficult to see how reviewability of all actions will
have a graver effect on their decisiveness than the threat of personal liability
has had. And for reasons stated above, the guard can continue to act on the
assumption that the regulation he carries out and the orders he gives must
be obeyed, whether or not they are ultimately approved by the court.
Underlying the contention that reviewability in and of itself will prove de-
trimental is the unarticulated fear that courts will approach problems of prison
administration with little familiarity and less sympathy for the extraordinary
difficulties which daily beset the prison staff. The hands-off doctrine thus nmay
be viewed as an implicit recognition by the courts of their institutional in-
capacity to pass judgment on complex matters of prison administration. This
position is not compelling for a number of reasons.
83. It is at least possible to suppose that reviewability, rather than increasing the prob.
lems of custody, will decrease them if inmates are given assurance that ultimately their
petitions will receive consideration on the merits. As Sykes has pointed out,
.. the custodians' task of maintaining order within the prison is acerbated by the
conditions of life which it is their duty to impose on their captives.
SYKES 22.
84. 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
85. 208 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1953) ; see also People v. Whipple, 100 Cal. App. 261, 279
Pac. 1008 (1929) (alleged unsanitary conditions and brutal mistreatment by prison camp
custodian held not to justify prisoner's escape).
86. See note 40 supra.
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First, it should not be assumed that courts will necessarily prove hostile and
deficient in understanding. The widespread acceptance of the hands-off doc-
trine provides ample demonstration that the courts are highly sensitive to the
problems of prison administration, are keenly aware of their own lack of ex-
pertise, and thus probably will act with great restraint in passing upon ac-
tions by prison administrators which appear to be reasonable exercises of dis-
cretion.87 While the standards to be developed by the courts will be discussed
later, it is most likely that courts will insist that regulations and decisions be
only a reasonable means and not the best possible means to accomplish a given
end.88 Thus, judges will not be attempting, through review, to second guess
prison officials on how best to run the system. In many instances, a judge, in
deciding upon the reasonableness of an official's actions, will be able to use the
prison's regulations as a guide for judging whether, according to the prison's
own standards, the action was a permissible one.
Further, without some form of review (and absent legislative creation of
administrative review, this is equivalent to saying" without judicial review"),
all regulations directed toward custody must be considered as self-validating
and as absolutely necessary. If this is so, then the counter principle enunciated
in Coffin v. Reichard-that a prisoner retains all rights except those taken
from him expressly or by necessary implication of law-becomes a hollow
guarantee indeed.
Moreover, the claim that every given regulation or practice is absolutely
indispensable to maintaining order and discipline should be regarded with
some degree of skepticism. There is substantial agreement among informed
observers of the prison system that discipline is actually maintained by a com-
plex set of informal relationships between the prison staff and the "inmate
society."8 9 Discipline, or the semblance thereof, is achieved by trading full en-
forcement for the cooperation of the inmate leaders. The further question then
arises how are the courts to know when a given action or regulation, while
apparently unreasonable, is not in actuality an integral part of the extra-of-
ficial system of maintaining order. (Where a functional basis for the practice
or regulation exists, no such problem arises as the courts will not strike it
down.) If no compelling justification for the practice or regulation can be
given other than that it is useful as an implement of potential harassment and
as a source of bargaining strength for guards in their dealings with inmates,
87. See, e.g., the court'es handling of use of force for disciplinary purposes in Its re
Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 22 Cal. Rptr 472, 372 P.2d 304 (1962).
88. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961) where the court in
holding contested prison, regulations to be reasonable dismissed the contention that less
restrictive regulations could easily have been utilized by prison officials:
The fact, if it be a fact, that access [to the courts] could have been further facilitated
without impairing effective prison administration, is likewise immaterial.
Id. at 640.
89. SYzs 45-62, 120-29; Yablonsky, supra note 65; Weinberg, Aspects of the Prison
Social Structure, 47 AmER. J. Soc. 717 (1942); McCorkle & Korn, Resocialication Within
Walls, 293 AxxAzs 88 (May 1954) ; CLasnst, THE PRISON CO~IM=NITY (1940).
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the courts would not be acting amiss in striking it down. Not only would
harassment thereby be alleviated but prison administrators would be aided in
assessing the effects of their regulations and in evaluating them on the basis of
their functional value. Further, to the extent that prison regulations are sup-
posed to teach a man to live in conformity with society's norms, the sporadic
and discretionary enforcement of an unreasonable regulation is likely to breed
contempt of the law.90
Finally, it should be pointed out that these objections to the hands-off doc-
trine are not necessarily coupled with the proposition that courts are the in-
stitution best suited to review prison administration. It is only suggested that
in the absence of any suitable means of review some form of review is de-
sirable. And if courts operate, even poorly, in a review capacity, this may
prove an incentive to the creation of more appropriate review mechanisms.
3. Rehabilitation. Given recidivism rates which reach to sixty per cent and
more, it is subject to debate whether prisons serve a rehabilitative function at all
and whether, to the extent such a function is served, it is by accident or design.
Lack of educational, recreational, therapeutic, and vocational training facilities
mean that to the extent such a function is served, a significant contribution is, or
at least can be, made by the custodial staff who, by enforcing the rule of prison
law, prepare inmates for a law-abiding life upon release. Such has been the
contention of at least one warden:
Custody is frequently dismissed as a rather sordid and punitive operation,
consisting chiefly of keeping inmates perpetually locked, counted, and con-
trolled. Almost as if in opposition to this, treatment and welfare are
described as attempts to introduce freedom and dignity into custody's
restrictive, punitive context by the provision of recreation, education, and
counselling. This traditional contrast, disfigured by bias and half-truth,
misses the central reality of the inmate's life in prison ...
The evaluation [of the institution's contribution] must rather be made
in terms of how the prison authorities are affecting the total social climate,
how successful they are in enabling the less hostile persons to advance
themselves, how successfully they are protecting these people from in-
timidation or exploitation by the more anti-social inmates, how effectively
they curb and frustrate the lying, swindling, and covert violence which
is always under the surface of the inmate social world.
The efficient custodian now emerges from the role of restrictor and
becomes the one who safeguards inmate welfare.0 '
Assuming for the time being that the custodial regime of a prison pro-
vides a major element in the correctional experience of inmates, does it follow
that the custodian qua therapist can do no wrong? And assuming that lie
might deviate from his role of therapist, should there not be means whereby
such deviation can be brought to light, the practice corrected, and any in-
90. Hartung & Floch, A Social-Psychological Analysis of Prison Riots: An flypoth-
esis, 47 J. Caim. L., C. & P.S. 51 (1956); MCCLEERY, POLICY CHIANGE IN PRISON MAN-
AGEMENT (1957) ; SYrxs 122-29.
91. Warden's report on the operations of the New Jersey State Prison for the year 1953-
54 reprinted in SYKEs 36.
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jury redressed ?92 If the custodian can play a supportive role in the correc-
tional process, does it not follow that the regulations imposed for custodial
purposes should be consistent with correctional objectives so far as possible?
This does not necessarily mean that courts will, in accordance with the dictates
of a correctional philosophy, require prison officials to employ the least de-
priving alternative in achieving a certain end. However, a correctional philoso-
phy would certainly support the need already mandated under a retributive
philosophy for review of arbitrary and extreme deprivations which bear no
reasonable relation to the purpose for which they are allegedly imposed. And,
in order to decide which deprivations under either a correctional or a retri-
butive view are so extreme as to warrant relief, all petitions will at least have
to be considered.
Furthermore, the availability or nonavailability of a review mechanism per-
ceived as impartial may have important rehabilitative implications in con-
firming or altering the inmate's view of society. The negative implications of
denying review, thereby confirming the inmate's conception of a pervasively
hostile unreceptive environment, have already been noted by one court:
An individual, once validly convicted and placed under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Correction .... is not to be divested of all rights and
unalterably abandoned and forgotten by the remainder of society. If these
situations were placed without the ambit of the writ's protection, we
would thereby encourage the unrestricted, arbitrary and unlawful treat-
ment of prisoners, and eventually discourage prisoners from co-operating
in their rehabilitation.93
Beyond this negative possibility, it is possible to speculate that some positive
gains might result from the process of seeking review of grievances." Thus,
92. See Yablonsky, supra note 65, and McCLEE.Y, op. cit. supra note 90, for a discus-
sion of the long range institutional and educational implications of making guards an in-
tegral part of the rehabilitative process.
93. People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston 9 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 174 N.E2d 725, 726, 215
N.Y.S.2d 44, 45-46 (1961) (emphasis added).
94. The process of petitioning the courts, and being granted or denied relief, could
serve as a useful point of departure for the inmate, with the aid of the therapeutic staff, to
gain perspective on himself. With help, the prisoner might come to some realization that
his objection to specific prison conditions really stemmed from far deeper personal frustra-
tions and needs. Thus the complaint, as an attempt by the prisoner to shift the blame for
his situation to his environment, may provide an opportunity for exploring his own faulty
modes of perceptiom
McCorkle & Korn's summariation of the principles of therapeutic treatment offers
a useful framework within which to view the voicing of grievances through legal channels.
In summarizing basic therapeutic principles they point out that a
person must somehow be brought to an awareness that his difficulties are related to
motives and patterns of perception ithin himself ....
... [a] ssistance towards understanding comes about through some relationship
with the therapist (or therapeutic situation) in which the individual actually attempts
to make his faulty modes of perception and behavior work.
McCorkle & Korn, stpra note 89, at 96-97 (emphasis added).
If we view the process of seeking review of administrative decisions as a "therapeutic
situation," then the rehabilitative potential of what might be called "gripe petitions" begins
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for example, time spent reading law books, learning of constitutional guaran-
tees, or becoming aware of the method provided by society whereby one ef-
fectuates one's desires and protects one's rights may provide a highly valuable
educational experience for the prisoner.95
4. Deterrence. It does not appear to be seriously maintained that the court's
position on the reviewability of prison officials' decisions will have any effect
on the deterrent impact which fear of undergoing incarceration has on potential
wrongdoers. In any event, such a contention would be too speculative to com-
pel retaining the hands-off doctrineY6
There is, however, one sense in which it may be said that abandonment of
the hands-off doctrine is consistent with the deterrent aim of the criminal law.
To the extent that such review may provide an impetus for penal reform, it
is possible that recidivism rates would be lowered. And the greater the visi-
bility given to the penal system's needs and shortcomings, the more likely it
is that society will come to appreciate the false economy of its niggardly allow-
ance for the treatment of criminals.
GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL REvIEW OF THE PRISON SYSTEM
The foregoing discussion has attempted to demonstrate that the rationales
customarily invoked to support the application of the hands-off doctrine to all
kinds of alleged deprivations are untenable. It remains to inquire what conse-
quences may follow if the courts abandon the hands-off doctrine and determine
on the basis of the allegations in each case if judicial relief is warranted. While
prediction is a risky business, some of the approaches which courts may take
to the problem of prison administration are indicated in existing case law.
First, courts will probably view the prison as an administrative agency as did
the New Jersey court in McBride v. McCorkle.0 7 Speaking of the reviewabil-
ity of disciplinary measures taken by a warden which allegedly deprived a
prisoner of freedom of worship, it stated:
We have, then, a final decision or action by a state administrative agency
within the meaning of . . . [the statute providing for judicial review of
to emerge. At bottom, these petitions are merely one of the repeated and futile efforts in
which the inmate engages to avoid admitting that his present plight is the product of his
own faulty values and modes of perception. As McCorkle & Korn, point out "Repeated
demonstration of [the] failure [of these faulty modes of perception and behavior] may be
necessary before he is able to abandor them." Id. at 97. The process of testing those faulty
modes of perception by appeal to an admittedly impartial body outside the immediate prison
system could conceivably make an important contribution, in helping an inmate to abandon
his former beliefs. Cf. Perl, Therapeutic Use of Certain Defects of the Usual Prison, 47
J. CR mh. L., C. & P.S. 58 (1956).
95. Apparently, the Warden at Dannemora feels this to be so. Clark, Federal Procedaral
Reform and States' Rights; to a mnore Perfect Union, 40 TEx. L. RMv. 211, 218-19 (1962).
96. See the discussion of the deterrent effect of capital punishment in SEuLnL, Tin
DATH PENALTY 15-79 (1959). If death has no ascertainable deterrent effect distinguish-
able from that of imprisonment, a distinction between modes of imprisonment is likely to
have, if possible, even less deterrent impact.
97. 44 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (1957).
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final decisions by state administrative agencies], and so proceed to discuss
the merits.98
Second, viewing the prison as an administrative agency, the customary rule of
exhaustion of administrative remedies will probably be applied.o Third, the
more adequate the remedies and review procedures provided, the greater the
presumption of validity which should-and probably will-attend the decision
of the reviewing authorities.100
If the courts were to attribute a higher presumption of reasonableness to the
decisions of a prison administrator where they had been passed on by an inde-
pendent and informed reviewing board, this would certainly provide a desir-
able stimulus for adopting adequate reviewing procedures. The events which
transpired in New York after the Court of Appeals ruling in People ex rel.
Brown v. Johnston '0 are illustrative of the impetus toward administrative
reform that a court's insistence on adequate remedial mechanisms can create.
The court ruled, contrary to prevailing case law, that transfer of an inmate
from a prison to an institution for the criminally insane without provision for
notice and hearing was unconstitutional. 0 2 It gave short shrift to the argument
of administrative discretion and prison discipline:
Although the availability of the writ of habeas corpus for this purpose
may be a source of administrative inconvenience, it is not justification for
a denial. It is well here to repeat that "the rights of the best of men are
secure only as the rights of the vilest and most abhorrent are protected."'u
Immediately following this decision, the court was so flooded with habeas
corpus petitions from the institution for the criminally insane that it had to
hold separate sessions at the institution.104 In reaction to this, the Correction
Department submitted a bill to prevent transfers of inmates to hospitals or
institutions for the insane without appropriate hearings. This bill was sup-
ported by both the Attorney General and the Correction Department, and has
now been enacted.' 0 5
98. Id. at 476, 130 A.2d at 885.
99. See generally 3 DAvis §§ 20.01-20.10.
100. The Federal Bureau of Prisons has established a prisoner's mail box through
which the prisoner may send uncensored mail from the federal penitentiary in which he is
confined to his Congressman, Senator and to the director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
Officials at the Bureau read these complaints and make such dispositions as they deem fit
by remanding the matter to the warden with appropriate instructions. Lowe v. Hiatt, 77
F. Supp. 303, 305 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
The lack of adequate procedures in, many state prison systems for inspection of prisons
and for adequate review of prisoner grievances contrasts markedly with the federal system.
See generally Widdifield, The State Convict 95-99 (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale
Law School Library 1952).
101. 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215 N.Y.S2d 44 (1961).
102. However the scope of this holding has been sharply limited by People ex rel.
Harris v. LaVallee, 16 App. Div. 2d 990, 229 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1962).
103. 9 N.Y.2d 482, 486, 174 N.E.2d 725, 726, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (1961).
104. The Journal is indebted to Mr. Ephraim London, attorney for the prisoner-appel-
lant in People ex reL Brown, v. Johnston, sitpra note 101, for the description of the events
which followed the Court of Appeals decision.
105. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 393.
19631
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
It is not to be supposed that courts will ever formulate a rule of law that
says "The extent and adequacy of provisions for administrative review of de-
cisions by prison administrators will determine the extent to which such de-
cisions shall be accorded a presumption of reasonableness." Rather it is sug-
gested that such a sliding scale will be (and is) the net effect of utilization
by the courts of such traditional criteria for review of administrative decisions
as opportunity to be heard,106 separation of adjudicatory and prosecutory func-
tions, 07 and bias.'08
Lack of opportunity to be heard has already been used as the basis for over-
turning an administrative decision involving a prisoner. 09 And the courts, in
situations where it seems appropriate, may couple this with further require-
ments 110 such as the right to counsel, the right to receive advance notice of the
nature of the issue to be decided, the right to full and effective dissemination of
all pertinent rules and sanctions, adequate opportunity for preparation and
access to resources necessary to contest effectively a decision which will result
in a deprivation."'
While imposition of formal safeguards is the most obvious way in which a
court can supervise (and change) a correctional system which is lacking in
satisfactory administrative remedies, the standard of bias represents potentially
the most flexible criterion for altering the strength of the presumption of rea-
sonableness which attends the acts and decisions of prison officials. While
direct pecuniary interest in the decision is the clearest grounds for disqualify-
ing an administrative official and overturning his decision, other types of per-
sonal involvement have been held to constitute bias:
Somewhat more subtle than direct pecuniary interests are interests of
other kinds that may be thought to come within the ancient injunction
106. See generally 1 DAVIS §§ 7.01-7.20.
107. See generally 2 DAvis §§ 12.01-12.06.
108. See generally 2 DAvis §§ 13.01-13.11.
109. People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E2d 725, 215 N.Y.S.2d
44 (1961).
110. The felt compulsion to impose such checks will-and should-lessen as the State
provides other, and more functionally suited, remedial mechanisms. A court, one may sus-
pect, will tend to require safeguards drawn from the advocacy system, a system concerned
with the ascertainment of guilt or innocence, liability or non-liability. These safeguards
(and such a criterion as separation of prosecutory and adjudicatory functions) may seem
ill-suited to a system interested in rehabilitation and more concerned with perceiving the
whole person and predicting the course of his future conduct than, with merely ascertaining
his culpability or non-culpability at a time, past. See Note, Freedom and Rehabilitation in
Parole Revocation Hearings, 72 YALE L.J. 368 (1962). Such formal safeguards drawn, from
an advocate system seems more appropriate to a situation, where society is concerned with
ascertaining guilt than to a therapeutically oriented correctional system. However, to the
extent that the lack of more functionally suited administrative remedies within the penal
system is the product of retributive sentiments, then. the imposition of advocacy safeguards
drawn from a retributive context is appropriate. To the extent that such safeguards are
inappropriate, they will force a clarification of objectives, a redesigning of remedial pro-
cedures in line with those objectives, and a reallocation of resources consonant with the
changed priority that the revaluation brings.
111. See discussion at text accompanying notes 258-68 infra.
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that "no man shall be a judge in his own cause." ... Here we have...
what may be a basic distinction: to have opinions about issues of policy
does not disqualify, but actively to align oneself with one side in a particu-
lar cause to be adjudicated may disqualify, even in absence of a combina-
tion of judging with prosecuting or accusing.-'
Thus, the mere existence of a review procedure should not determine the de-
gree of deference to be accorded its decisions. A court should not overlook the
extent to which the review mechanism may be incapable of truly policing the
system because of an interest in vindicating the judgment and bolstering the
authority of the official whose action it is reviewing. Where the reviewing body
is accountable to an authority altogether different from the body charged with
the actual administration of the prison system, its decisions are more likely to
reflect that impartiality to which the greatest weight should be accorded. Thus,
recognition by the courts of the ego involvement of prison officials in covering
up abuses, coupled with an awareness of the community of interest among
prison employees and the relationship of personal advancement to continual
vindication in all conflicts with inmates, may lead courts to utilize the degree
of bias present in order to define the intensity of review and the strength of
the presumption of reasonableness to be accorded an official's action or de-
cision.
On one end of the continuum will be, for example, the prison guard who
inflicted the injury and to whom vindication is all important.113 His judgment
as to the reasonableness of his actions is entitled to least weight. On the other
end of the continuum might stand the reasoned decision by a court-appointed
referee or a board composed of highly qualified, disinterested persons whose
function is to review and assess the entire prison system with an eye to con-
tinual change and improvement." 4 Somewhere in between is the judgment of
the prison warden who is interested in maintaining the morale of his staff by
approving the actions of his guards but who also presumably is anxious to
run a "model prison" and at least desires to avoid extreme repercussions such
as widespread violence, vandalism, or riots.115
112. 2 DAvis § 12.03 at 159.
113. See In re Jones, 22 Cal. Rptr. 478, 372 P.2d 310 (1962) for a sample of the con-
flicting accounts of alleged prison brutality given by inmates and guards. The court felt the
inmates' testimony to be impeachable because they were convicted felons, but appears to
have relied most heavily on statements of the prison doctor and two members of the Adult
Authority parole board in deciding whose story to believe.
114. See In re Riddle, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304 (1962), where the court says
of the referee's findings:
These findings are all supported by substantial evidence. But even though they are
so supported they are not binding on this court. They are, however, entitled to great
weight.
22 Cal. Rptr. at 474, 372 P.2d at 305.
115. See Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962) discussed in text ac-
companying notes 132-37, 179-81 infra. There a reasonableness test was applied to all con-
tested deprivations with the result that the court deferred to the warden's judgment on
certain points and overturned it on others.
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Where the administrative procedures provided are deemed adequate the
courts are likely to respect the appealed-from decision unless it is capricious
or arbitrary. Where, however, the mechanism is less than adequate, the court
will have two choices. First, it may reverse the decision for lack of proper
remedial safeguards. Or second, it can choose to review on the merits, Be-
cause of the inadequacy of remedial safeguards, or because of the absence of
any administrative record setting out the facts and the grounds for the ad-
ministrative decision, the decision below is not entitled to the deference which
the "capricious or arbitrary" test 1 6 accords to administrative expertise;
rather the courts are likely to apply a more stringent standard, one closer to
the time-honored "reasonableness test."
The Reasonableness Test-A Problem of Judicial Administration and Defini-
tion. Giving content to "reasonableness" in the prison context will involve two
distinct problems, one largely administrative, the other definitional.
It is not unlikely that abandonment of the hands-off doctrine will result in
an increased number of petitions from prisoners alleging some form of mis-
treatment. Some of these petitions will be contesting deprivations which are
so clearly reasonable that the court can dismiss the petition on the basis of the
allegations. On the other hand, many petitions will be framed in such a man-
ner that the complaint, if true, would present a claim for which relief would
be warranted. It is to be expected that prisoners will present their claims so as
to avoid dismissals through a mere reading of the allegations; this will present
the courts with certain administrative problems. The courts will have to find
some way of informing themselves of the extent to which there is evidence to
substantiate the factual basis of the claims asserted. Obviously, it would be
better if a court had before it a full administrative record which incorporated
findings of fact and a reasoned disposition of the complaint such as, for in-
stance, a file of correspondence between the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the
warden of a penitentiary concerning a complaint which had come to the
Bureau through the prisoner's mail box. In the absence of such a record, it
is unlikely that a formal trial with its attendant inconvenience and expense will
result from every petition. Neither the courts nor the prisons will tolerate the
demands on time or facilities that would result from calling the inmate peti-
tioner and his witnesses, the guard and his witnesses, the prison doctor and
the prison warden to testify concerning each complaint where there is a dis-
puted issue of fact. It is far more likely that courts will appoint a referee who
will take evidence and make findings of fact. Regardless of how the evidence
is gathered, the result of abandoning the hands-off doctrine will doubtless
be a multitude of petitions alleging mistreatment. To the extent that such
petitions contain arguable issues of law and substantial conflicts in evidence,
116. See, e.g., Cole v. Manning, 125 S.E.2d 621, 625 (S.C. 1962). However, on issues
of fact, the courts will apply the "substantial evidence on, the record considered as a whole"
test. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 485 (1951). (Italics and footnote
omitted.) In re Riddle, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304 (1962), applies the latter formula
to a determination by an, impartial referee that a guard did not abuse his discretion in using
force. See also In re Jones, 22 Cal. Rptr. 478, 372 P.2d 310 (1962).
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the extra burden placed on the judiciary must be borne if prisoners' rights are
to be vindicated. However, where the allegations involved are clearly frivolous,
or where evidence to corroborate the inmate's assertions is altogether lacking,
the imposition of sanctions on prisoners for raising frivolous issues should
somewhat alleviate the problem. 1 7
The definitional problems resulting from an application of the reasonable-
ness standard are as difficult as the administrative ones. Defining "reasonable-
ness" in the prison context will involve not only the normal difficulties in-
herent in such a flexible standard but also will require a sophisticated ap-
preciation of the extent to which the prison system mediates between the often
contradictory goals of the criminal law and constantly is forced into compro-
mises by limited resources. Courts, in testing prison regulations and the actions
of officials by a standard of reasonableness, will have to start distinguishing
those actions and regulations which stem so directly from the structure of
penal institutions and the allocation of resources to the prison system as to be
deprivations imposed "'by necessary implication... [of] law"' 18 and therefore
virtually per se reasonable, from those actions and regulations which could be
condemned by a court without forcing a radical reconstitution of the present
system. To the extent that penal statutes and sentences are predicated on some
assumed minimal level of deprivation, such deprivations dearly result "from
necessary implication of law."
Many of the deprivations undergone by prisoners which in theory could be
eliminated are the product of limitations in scientific knowledge and of the
low priority which society has given the penal system in allocating resources.
Restrictive parole criteria, undifferentiated treatment of all prisoners as po-
tential escapees, over-assignment of prisoners to maximum security institu-
tions, and prison terms imposed without regard to the period which therapy
might reasonably require are direct products of our limited knowledge in the
realm of therapeutic and predictive techniques. But they are also the product
of retributive sentiments and a virtually paranoid fear of ex-convicts which
caused one "scientific" study to weigh the loss to society caused by one re-
cidivist at one hundred and the gain to society contributed by each non-re-
cidivist as zero." 9 The ambivalence of our commitment to the rehabilitative
117. See discussion in text accompanying notes 258-61 infra.
118. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944). Such a distinction may be
implicit in the following statement of Judge Sobeloff in Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196,
197 (4th Cir. 1961):
There is an extensive detailed specification of deprivations and hardships inflicted
for no infraction of any rule, and solely bcause of what the appellants describe as
their religion. Moreover, it is asserted... that the prison officials have suppressed
their letters to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia setting fort their
grievances in an effort to obtain relief administratively. In these circumstances the
case is manifestly unlike those in which courts have declined to interfere because
particular disciplinary measures were taken, withiz the normal ,nanagenent of the
institution.
Id. at 197. (Emphasis added.)
119. Goodman, Generalizing theProblem of Prediction, 17Am7Rs Soc. Rnv. 609 (1952).
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goals of the criminal law leads to our funneling but minimal resources into
the prison system. The result is a large number of institutionalized depriva-
tions produced by obsolescent prison facilities, austerity budgets, underpaid
and unqualified staff, token research efforts, and inadequate recreational, edu-
cational, and therapeutic facilities.120 The courts are likely to be most un-
willing to afford relief from those deprivations which stem directly from the
limited allocation of resources to penal institutions, since relief from these
kinds of deprivations must generally come from legislatures. It is clear that
courts can make inroads even on this necessary level of deprivation, both by
suggesting legislative action and by insisting on certain minimal rights, the
protection of which undoubtedly involves administrative inconvenience and
greater expense. It may be argued that such inroads, no matter how minor, in-
volve a usurpation of the legislative function, for it is clear that the recogni-
tion and extension of rights is expensive.
Nonetheless, within certain broad limits to be discussed shortly, a court
must be prepared either to extend rights which result in greater costs to the
penal system or to treat all deprivations as "necessary" or "reasonable per so"
and therefore beyond reproach. A court, if it is determined not to tamper with
resource allocation, must assume that any decision made by the prison authori-
ties is always proper and reasonable. If courts are to review such decisions,
new costs will necessarily be incurred in at least two ways. First, the time of
judicial decision makers spent in co-administering the prison system must be
considered as part of the cost to society of running that system. Second, to
the extent that the remaking of those decisions results in the extension of new
and costly rights, the result will be greater expense to society. For example, an
extra hour of time to write habeas corpus petitions may involve more storage
space, more library facilities, more supervision, more employees to screen
mail, and less time available for revenue-producing labor. Thus, the test of
whether a deprivation is "necessary" cannot be formulated solely in terms of
whether abolishing the deprivation in question will result in reallocating re-
sources.
Rather, in attempting to implement what was earlier referred to as the
counter principle to the hands-off doctrine-that a prisoner retains all rights
except those taken away from him either explicitly or by necessary implica-
tion of law--courts will have to consider whether a contested deprivation is so
clearly the product of structural characteristics of the prison system as to appear
necessary. 12 ' The courts in attempting to decide how deeply a given depriva-
120. See discussion of the implications of retribution for resource allocation at text
accompanying notes 59-64 supra. The situation was described graphically by the dissent in
Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253, 277-78 n.9 (2d Cir. 1962).
121. Once one begins with this presumption in favor of an inmate's rights, courts may
shift to the prison administration the task of demonstrating the reasonableness and perhaps
even the relative necessity from a structural point of view of the particular course of action
chosen. This need not necessarily take the form of a shift in the burden of proof. The
prisoner will still have to allege a deprivation and allege that that deprivation could have
been avoided by other arrangements. But practically speaking the burden will and should
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tion is rooted in structural aspects of prison society will want to consider not
only how major a reallocation of resources would be necessary to remove the
deprivation but also the extent to which that deprivation emanates from widely
held cultural attitudes and from traditional arrangements which are deeply
entrenched in certain modes of prison administration. Thus, a deprivation
should be deemed to be imposed "by necessary implication of law," where its
elimination will impose drastically greater expense on the system or will re-
quire a total reorganization of the system even if no greater resources are re-
quired. In making this inquiry, prison regulations, practices, avowed principles,
and comparisons among institutions within the particular penal system under
scrutiny may be useful to the court. Thus, for instance, deprivations resulting
from common disciplinary and security oriented regulations, such as restric-
tions on visiting rights, possession of contraband, and limitations on freedom
of movement would seem most clearly systemic.
To be sure, the difference betveen systemic deprivations which are deemed
inevitable, customary, and irremediable and those deprivations which are either
avoidable or compensible is by no means a clear cut one. Systemic considera-
tions are likely to be present in all deprivations occurring within prisons. Thus,
even in deprivations of religious freedom which courts seem most prone to
treat as non-systemic and impermissible, systemic factors based on prison
discipline, on the lack of facilities for religious worship, and on the likelihood
that dissemination of religious doctrines will lead to disturbance, may and have
arisen.1
22
The following discussion will attempt to indicate the kinds of allegations
which the courts are likely to confront should they decide to review prisoners'
claims on the merits. The quantity and variety of claims likely to be presented
are, if past petitions are any indication, myriad in number for, as our penal
system is presently constituted, incarceration entails regulation of the most
minute phases of each inmate's life. With regulation go all pervasive depriva-
tions, many of which have been and will be challenged by inmates in legal
proceedings. The hands-off doctrine has, by and large, prevented any adjudica-
tion on the merits or any findings of fact as to the prisoner's assertions. Hence,
the following case law profile of prisoner deprivations is principally a summary
of the unproven allegations contained in the petitions of inmates. Chief among
these are allegations involving 1) deprivations of freedom of movement; 2) of
freedom of expression; 3) of religious freedom; 4) of sexual relations; 5) of
security of the person; 6) of property, goods, and services; and 7) of effective
shift to prison officials, first, because it will not be difficult for the prisoner to concoct some
reasonably plausible alternative arrangement which would have realized the same penal
objectives but would not have resulted in the complained of deprivation, and second, under a
familiar evidentiary principle, prison officials, having special expertise and being in sole
control of the facts necessary to determine the issue, should be forced to come forvard as
only they are in a position to explain the relative necessity (or lack of it) for the depriving
regulation. Cf. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
122. See, e.g., McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (1957) ; see also
discussion of deprivation of religious freedom at text accompanying notes 159-81 infra.
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remedial safeguards. Within each of these categories of alleged deprivations
the courts will have to sort out structural from non-structural deprivations.
Deciding which class the alleged deprivation falls in-structural or non-
structural-will have to be done on a case by case basis with the result hinging
on the particular facts. The courts will not be able to rule out a priori certain
kinds of deprivations as exempt by nature from judicial scrutiny. For even
though it is clear that in some of the aforementioned categories the bulk of
situations will be plainly structural, there is always the possibility of extreme
or wholly arbitrary deprivations which would make judicial relief appropriate.
In sorting out systemic or structural deprivations, certain situations requiring
a prospective remedy can be handled by the courts in a way which may obviate
the necessity of determining whether a given deprivation is justified by the
needs of the prison system. For a court may order the appropriate official to
issue regulations governing the case before it. Thus, where regulations already
exist, or can be promulgated to govern a situation, the court may, as it has
done in other situations, simply hold the prison officials to observance of their
own regulations12- 3 In such a case it may be said that the regulations of the
institution constitute an admission that the deprivation is not systemic in the
sense of being a necessary result of the organization of the penal institution.
Nonetheless, there will be instances where no such mechanical way of dis-
tinguishing between structural and non-structural exists and the courts will
have to pass on the reasonableness of a regulation or the reasonableness of an
official's actions in a situation not governed by any regulation.
The kinds of situations likely to face the courts and the considerations which
may persuade them to permit or proscribe a given deprivation will be dealt
with under the above-mentioned categories of deprivations. The discussion of
each of the categories will summarize those deprivations which have been al-
leged in reported cases. Because of the hands-off doctrine, there has been no
need to decide whether these allegations involved structural or non-structural
deprivations. But within each category there will be an attempt-admittedly
tentative and highly speculative-to indicate how the courts may or should
draw lines between systemic and non-systemic situations.
Deprivation of Freedom of Movement. If a judgment can be drawn from the
bare allegations found in reported cases, deprivation of freedom of movement is
not completed when the inmate's world becomes circumscribed by the guard
walls of the prison. 124 Physical movement may be still further restricted to a
segregation wing for alleged misconduct and can be continued for years despite
good behavior on the inmate's part.'2 There appears to be no limit on the
potential restriction of physical movement, as illustrated by the case of the famed
"Bird Man of Alcatraz" whose confinement in a isolation cell for life was ac-
123. See, e.g., In the Matter of Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E.2d 791,
225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962) ; Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
124. Nor does it end when he issues forth from those confines as a parolee. See von
Hentig, Degrees of Parole Violation and Graded Rencdial Measures, 33 J. Cnlu. L., C. &
P.S. 363 (1943).
125. McBride v. McCorkle, supra note 122.
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cepted by the courts as within the range of administration discretion2 - Even in
instances where restraints upon movement appear to have been prompted by
consideration of an inmate's race or religion, the courts have not seen fit to
intervene.127
If there is any category of deprivation which most dearly appears to be
structural, it is that of deprivation of freedom of movement which invariably
accompanies conviction and sentence to a penal institution. Yet, even in this
category, there may arise cases which will prompt courts to treat some de-
privations as not justified by systemic considerations. The clearest of such
cases where a court will not hesitate to grant relief is where a prisoner alleges
that he has been improperly convicted and therefore is being detained illegal-
ly.'28 Similarly, where detention persists beyond the period of sentence less
deductions for good time earned, the courts feel no compunction about re-
quiring release.129 The more difficult problem arises under this class of de-
privations in situations where a prisoner is sent to isolation for no apparently
justifiable reason ' 30 or is disciplined for a questionable or illegitimate rea-
son.131 Courts have, nevertheless, intervened in these situations, as, for in-
126. Stroud v. Johnstor, 139 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1943).
127. United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir.
1953) ; Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal. 1959) ; In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d
663, 361 P.2d 417 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961). The onslaught of cases in-
volving Black Muslims now reaching the courts may change this situation radically. See
text accompanying notes 162-81 infra. The appeal to Negroes irk prison of a militant religion
preaching hatred of whites and the superiority of Negroes is likely to turn the issue of
racial discrimination into one of religious discrimination where the courts have shown
greater willingness to intervene. In Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962),
the court notes indirectly the potential of the Black Muslims religion as a means of giving
the Negro the additional leverage of the first amendment.
Prison authorities have acknowledged that petitioner seems very devoted to his faith,
and that it "is in some way related to increasing his status as a negro * * '" To him
the main attraction of the Muslim faith is that it gave him something to associate
himself with, something to uplift him from the degradation to which he had fallen.
Id. at 372. It is a matter of no small irony that the general rights of the prison population
are likely to undergo radical improvement through the agitation of the Black Mfuslims.
For this reason the historian may view recent developments in the realm of prisoners' rights
as an illustration of the statement that "it is the evolving status of the Negro that has
furnished the main theme for America's saga of equality." CAUn, THE PRFDICMENT or
DEmocRATrc MAN 125 (1961). And we may observe the phenomenon which that author
has noted: "[I]n American experience what begins as a special privilege often becomes first
a general privilege, then a general social right, and ultimately an individual legal right."
Id. at 124.
128. This is, of course, the traditional function of habeas corpus.
129. See, e.g., Application of Hughes, 372 P.2d 885 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962).
130. Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961) (isolation solely because of the
religious faith of the petitioner).
131. In re Riddle, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304 (1962) (prisoner disciplined for
making "false" statements criticizing prison officials in his habeas corpus petition before
court has passed on truth or falsity of those statements). Cf. In re Maddox, 351 Mfich. 358,
88 N.W2d 470 (1958) (petitioner civilly committed to treatment center under sexual
psychopath statute transferred to penitentiary in order "to make obdurate criminal sexual
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stance, in Fulwood v. Clemmer,132 where the prisoner was removed from the
general prison population and was detained in various forms of solitary con-
finement for a period of two years for having made inflammatory racist re-
marks to a group of fellow Black Muslims assembled within the hearing of
other prisoners. One consequence of intervention in these situations is that a
court may require that some form of hearing be provided for the inmate prior
to imposition of such deprivations. 13 3 Further, courts may on occasion be
forced to inquire whether a prisoner actually committed the offense for which
he is allegedly being disciplined,134 although the necessity for such an inquiry
will be obviated where there has been a fact finding hearing at the prison level
and there is therefore a record for a court to review. Once the fact issue is
resolved by a finding that the offense actually was committed by the petitioner,
a court must still decide whether the offense warrants that particular further
deprivation of freedom of movement challenged by the inmate.
The principle which may come to govern in such cases is one stated in a
concurrence by Mr. Justice Douglas in Robinson v. California:3 0 that the
imposition of a deprivation bearing no reasonable relation to the offense con-
stitutes both a denial of due process and a cruel and unusual punishment
within the ambit of the eighth amendment.18 6 This principle, though enunciated
in a case striking down a law making narcotic addiction a crime, was cited by
the court in Fulwood v. Clemmer 13 7 as the basis for requiring prison authori-
psychopaths more ready to accept the treatment and assistance toward recovery offered.. ."
351 Mich. at 365, 88 N.W2d at 474).
132. 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
133. See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
134. See discussion of the problems involved in resolving disputed factual clahns at
text accompanying notes 116-17 supra and 258-61 infra. The clearest instance where such
an inquiry is necessary is where the prisoner has been punished for making false accusa-
tions in his petition to the courts:
... if, when a prisoner, as he must, submits his proposed petition to the prison offi-
cials for their perusal, and the petition charges the officials with misconduct, the
prison officials can summarily decide that his charges are false and punish him for
making them, there is a form of coercion, that will very effectively prevent access to
the courts. One of the very issues presented by that petition was whether such charges
were true or false. Certainly, there is nothing wrong with a prison regulation pro-
hibiting the making of false charges, but the prisoner should be allowed full access
to the courts, and where the charges are contained in a court document the officials
should await the determination of the courts. For this reason it was improper to
make these charges and impose punishment before this court had acted.
In re Riddle, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 476-77, 372 P.2d 304, 308-09 (1962).
135. 82 Sup. Ct. 1417 (1962).
136. Id. at 1425. The use of the cruel and unusual punishment clause is criticized in
Comment, Black Muslims in Prison, Of Constitutional Rights and Muslim Rites, 62 CoLum.
L. 1kv. 1488, 1494 n27 (1962). The principle does not, as there suggested, rest wholly on
the eighth amendment when applied to the prison context. It may equally well, if not more
readily, be viewed as a denial of substantive due process.
137. "A punishment out of proportion to the violation may bring it within the bar
against unreasonable punishments." 206 F. Supp. 370, 379 (D.D.C. 1962). See text accom-
panying note 132 mupra.
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ties to cease from imposing a deprivation which exceeded the limits vrarranted
by the gravity of the offense.
While deference to the discretionary actions of prison authorities is dearly
necessary in the realm of discipline, the application of a rule requiring that the
punishment be roughly commensurate with the seriousness of the offense may
serve as an important check on prison abuses, and may come to be adopted,
as it has been at Sing Sing, 38 as a principle guiding prison discipline. Such
a rule is, to be sure, at odds with an important school of thought that one
should fit the punishment to the criminal rather than to the crime. Nonetheless,
it seems doubtful that courts will compel prison officials to devise post-con-
viction disciplinary sanctions according to the same principles which are ap-
plied in determining sentence upon conviction. 30 But such considerations as
the prior prison misconduct of the inmate, the degree of dangerousness mani-
fested by the act, and the extent of need for corrective or disciplinary treat-
ment manifested are likely to enter a court's deliberations in determining
whether an extreme deprivation of liberty is capricious or reasonable. 4 0
Deprivation of Freedom of Expression. Forms of expression traditionally
protected by the first amendment are subject to severe and even total curtail-
ment in prison. Severe infringements on freedom of speech 14 and associa-
tion 14 in prison have been upheld by the courts or ignored by them under the
rubric of the hands-off doctrine. Notvithstanding the amnesty granted in
particular instances after prison riots, 43 it is clear that the right to assemble
and to petition for a redress of grievances '4 is not permitted in prison. The
bulk of situations involving deprivation of expression which have come before
the courts involve the inmate's alleged right to communicate freely with the
outside world. It is customary to allow the inmate to write and to receive com-
138. Cook, From 7 A.M. to 10 P.M. at Sing Sing, N.Y. Times, March 4, 1962, § 6
(Magazine), pp. 40-41.
139. Such considerations include remorsefulness, e.-tent of harm to victims, treat-
ability, availability of treatment, and educational and criminal record. DoiNusux Er Ax.
44-47.
140. The considerations appear to have played a part in Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F-.
Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962), and doubtless were of importance in State v. Carpenter, 231 N.C.
229, 56 S.E.2d 713 (1949).
141. The list of offenses for which prisoners may be punished in the Idaho State Prison
includes: communication by signs, laughing and fooling, loud reading in cell, profanity,
staring at visitors, talking in chapel, talking in dining room, talking at work, talking from
cell to cell, talking in corridor.BARNs & TEgrFRs, NEW HoRIzoNs IN CnMxzro= 605
(rev. ed. 1950). See also State v. Carpenter, . pra note 140.
142. Although the opinions stated are those of a number of convicts, the letter is signed
by only one, for there is a prison rule against group e.\pressions or petitions of any
sort.
A Letter from Martin [a prisoner writing to the prison authorities], Do.muL, r ET Ai. 211.
143. SxKS 109-29. See generally Hartung & Floch, A Social-Psychological AnaklsiS
of Prison Riots: An Hypothesis, 47 J. CanR. L., C. & P.S. 51 (1956).
144. See note 142 stpra; see also GOFFmAN, AsvxLums 96-97 (1961) for an interesting
interpretation of the "ceremonial function" filled by prison newspapers and even legal peti-
tions.
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munications only from those persons on his approved mailing list.145 Further-
more, all communications, both sent and received, are subject to censorship
and confiscation by the prison authorities. The broad principles of censorship
and restricted mailing lists have been approved by the courts as a non-re-
viewable exercise of the discretion entrusted to prison authorities.140 And
particular attempts to test the peripheries of these rules have uniformly re-
sulted in upholding the actions of prison officials. Thus courts have deemed
beyond the scope of their review a ruling which allowed an inmate to receive
only those letters from his children which were written in their handwriting
and not letters from them penned by their mother. 47 The hands-off doctrine
has also been used to sanction a warden's decision to exclude an alleged com-
mon law wife from the authorized mailing list on grounds that the relationship
had no "constructive elements."148 Mail to the courts theoretically can not be
treated in the same manner, 49 but it can be delayed for a reasonable period of
time.' " Mail relating to one's legal affairs but addressed to persons other than
the court is not so privileged. 15 ' In another case involving the Bird Man, the
court refused to review the contention that the warden's prohibition of cor-
respondence in furtherance of the prisoner's business enterprise deprived him
of his constitutional rights.15 2 And one of the leading cases on prison censorship,
Numer v. Miller,'r3 sustained the confiscation of the first lesson sheet in a
145. See text accompanying note 154 infra for the U.S. Bureau of Prisons regulation
stating the principal aspects of prisoner mailing privileges.
146. See, e.g., Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Morris v. Igoe, 209 F.2d
108 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Dayton v. McGranery, 201 F.2d 711 (D.D.C. 1953) ; Adams v. Ellis,
197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Dayton v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 108 (10th Cir.), cert. denicd,
338 U.S. 888 (1949); Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948).
147. In the Matter of Johnson v. Commissioner, 6 App. Div. 2d 920, 175 N.Y.S.2d 689
(1958). The children had been born out of wedlock; the mother was married to another
man and the warden felt that past correspondence allegedly to the children was really to
the mother in circumvention of institutional regulations. Query: why is this any worse than
if the prisoner had done this after release? Whom is the warden trying to protect and what
is the function of the regulation? See CAHN, THE MORAL DECIsioN 77-78 (1955).
148. Fussa v. Taylor, 168 F. Supp. 302, 303 (M.D. Pa. 1958). The warden denied that
this woman was his common-law wife asserting that she was just the most recent in a series
of paramours.
149. See, e.g., Dowd v. United States ex rtI. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951) ; Ex parle
Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Spires v. Dowd, 271 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1959).
150. See Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361, 364 (D. Ore. 1959).
151. Wilson v. Dixon, 251 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Laughlin v. Cummings, 105 F.2d
71 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; United States ex r. Thompson v. Fay, 197 F. Supp. 855 (S.DN.Y.
1961) ; United States ex rel. Vraniak v. Randolph, 161 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ill. 1958) ; Jones
v. Hiatt, 50 F. Supp. 68 (M.D. Pa. 1943) ; In the Matter of Miller v. Wilkins, 31 Misc. 2d
700, 220 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1961).
152. Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951).
153. 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948) ; the inmate, in response to the request to state his
reasons for taking a correspondence course in English, had written in, his answer (which
constituted the first assignment) that he wished ultimately to write a book exposing prison
brutality. Cf. To the Rev. William Mason, Oct. 25, 1775, THE LETrRS OF HORACE WAL-
roLE 460 (W. Hadley, ed. 1926) (Everyman's Library) :
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correspondence course which the inmate had been encouraged to take by
prison authorities, on the usual grounds that this was a matter of prison man-
agement not subject to review by the court.
An examination of the Bureau of Prisons regulation on inmate correspon-
dence may illustrate the kind of analysis in which courts may engage if the
hands-off doctrine is abandoned. The regulation provides that correspondence
may be permitted whenever it does not appear that rehabilitation will
adversely be affected or that it will be detrimental to the well-being of the
inmate or his correspondent.
However, correspondence on business matters is expressly prohibited except
such as is
necessary to enable the inmate to protect and husband the property and
funds that were legitimately his at the time he entered the institution.'"
Abandonment of the hands-off doctrine and implementation of its counter
principle through the distinction between structural and non-structural de-
privations is likely to bring no invalidation of any part of the regulation on the
merits for severe restrictions on persons to whom one may correspond seem
rooted in structural considerations. Permitting inmates to correspond without
limitations would produce a volume of mail beyond the capacity of present pri-
son staffs to censor, to screen for escape plans, and to search for contraband.l25
The final portion of the regulation, that which prohibits business cor-
respondence, most dearly approaches the arbitrary to the extent that it is in
potential conflict with the first proposition that all correspondence which will
not adversely affect rehabilitation should be permitted.115 One possible ex-
planation for the no business correspondence section is that prison is not sup-
posed to be an occasion to exploit one's entrepreneurial skills. One can under-
stand this rationale as applied to gamblers, racketeers, or drug peddlers who
should be prevented from continuing their illegal activities while in prison.
However, under a correctional philosophy, imprisonment is intended to be
Monsieur de Malesherbes, in the most simple and unaffected manner, gave me an
account of his visitation of the Bastile, whence he released the prisoners, half of whom
were mad with their misfortunes, and many of whom he could not find even the
causes of their commitment.... This excellent magistrate, who made my tears run
down my cheeks, added that what the prisoners complained of most %was the want of
pen and ink. He ordered it. The demons remonstrated and said that the prisoners
would only make use of the pen to write memorials against the Ministers; he replied
"Tant nieux."
154. The text of this regulation is reprinted in the Circuit Court's opinion in Stroud
v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851 nr.1 (9th Cir. 1951).
155. See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-44 n.14 (1962), for an indication of the
magnitude of this problem.
156. The standards contained in the first portion saying that mail will not be permitted
that will adversely affect the rehabilitation of the prisoner or the welfare of the recipient
seem so vague as to provide almost no guide at all. And the paternalism involved in pro-
hibiting letters where it is thought that the welfare of the recipient will be adversely affected
seems unjustifiable to the extent that such protection would not be afforded the recipient
from "detrimental correspondence" by other persons or by the same prisoner upon release.
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"profitable" in the fullest sense of that word. To the extent that a legitimate
business may enable the inmate to become less embittered or may permit him
to ease the hardship of his imprisonment on his wife or children, such a pro-
hibition appears dearly retributive in function.
In spite of this, it seems safe to predict that even if the hands-off doctrine is
abandoned, the courts will not immediately invalidate the no business cor-
respondence section of this regulation.1 7 For this regulation is rooted in what
Sykes has termed "structural defects in the prison's system of power rather
than individual inadequacies." These defects include:
The lack of a sense of duty among those who are held captive, the obvious
fallacies of coercion, the pathetic collection of rewards and punishments to
induce compliance, the strong pressures toward the corruption of the
guard in the form of friendship, reciprocity, and the transfer of duties
into the hands of trusted inmates .... 11"
Given these structural defects, this regulation which bars business correspond-
ence is an attempt to prevent an inmate from using his outside resources to
gain individual leverage in a system all too prone to corruption. Viewed in
terms of the structure of the prison society, this regulation must be considered
as one more rehabilitation-defeating compromise forced on the system by
limited resources and internally conflicting objectives.
Deprivation of Religious Freedom. At least four cases indicate that freedom
of religion as normally known may permissibly be subjected to extensive curtail-
ment by prison authorities.15 9 In one of them, Kelly v. Dowd,10 the court utilized
the hands-off doctrine to deny relief to a claim of religious persecution where
the prisoner had been prevented from securing Bible study helps circulated by
the Watch Tower Society. The same reasoning was employed in Wright v. Wil-
kins 161 where the prisoner complained of being denied permission to take an
157. Courts may eventually take a dimmer view of the business correspondence pro-
hibition though the general necessity of limiting the volume of mail will persist. To the
extent that it is feared that such correspondence will lead to the acquisition of power with-
in the prison society, that danger can be averted by simply prohibiting the enjoyment of
such wealth. If it be argued that such a prohibition would be ineffective, then it should be
observed that the business correspondence regulation is in effect only a prohibition on the
acquisition and conservation of wealth by the poor since the rich can, under this argument,
corrupt the system at will. At present, the business correspondence regulation gives no con-
sideration at all to prisoners' interests while placing far too high a weight on assumptions
about penal administration which seem questionable. To the extent that the real problem
is one of sheer volume, a numerical limitation on the amount of correspondence would
provide a solution which would allow the prisoner to choose for himself within limits how
best to further his interests and concerns.
158. SYxEs 61. (All italicized in original.)
159. Some states provide a chaplain for prisoners while others merely grant permission
to different denominations to provide and support one. Widdifield, The State Convict, 1952
(unpublished J.S.D. dissertation in Yale Law School Library). The court carefully sklrted
the establishment of religion issue in McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d
881 (1957), but after Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), it may no longer be avoidable,
160. 140 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1944).
161. 26 Misc. 2d 1090, 210 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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Arabic grammar, allegedly needed for the prisoner's religious education, into
the recreation yard. In the other two cases, McBride z,. McCork 16 2 and In re
Ferguson,'3 the court, while denying relief, appears to have departed from the
non-intervention doctrine in its strict form and to have held on the merits that
the deprivations alleged were permissible exercises of administration discretion.
And in five recent cases involving Black Muslims, the courts have stated that a
complaint alleging infringement of religious rights presents a claim which the
courts will review on the merits.16 4 Thus it would appear that the application
of the hands-off doctrine to religious deprivations is highly uncertain and
probably now stands as the minority position.
For this reason, the cases involving claims of religious prosecution serve to
illustrate the way the courts may attempt to sort out structural from non-
structural deprivations. Allegations involving denials of religious freedom
would seem to provide the clearest example of a non-structural deprivation.
But here again it should be reiterated that no category of deprivations can be
approached as a priori structural or non-structural. Just as deprivation of free-
dom of movement involved the possibility of "non-structural" deprivation, so
the entire gamut can-and has-been run in cases involving alleged denials of
religious freedom.
One of the earlier religion cases, McBride v. McCorkle, (6 provides an
instance of infringement on religious freedom which was deemed by a court to
be structural. In McBride, the prisoner claimed that he had been denied op-
portunity to receive communion at chapel services for over two years. The
court in denying relief pointed out that the prisoner was prolibited from
attending chapel services because he was in the segregation wing where no
chapel was available and that it would be detrimental to prison discipline to al-
low the plaintiff to mingle with the general prison population. Moreover the
petitioner's plight was shared by thirty others and he had refused any altera-
tive religious ministration. The court also noted that a chapel in the segregation
wing was nearing completion, which graphically illustrates the point that
structural deprivations can frequently be eliminated. Nonetheless, it can be
assumed that the court would not have imposed on the prison system the
duty of building an additional chapel in the segregation wing. However, had no
substitute, such as individual communion, been available to the inmate the
court might well have taken a different view.
Various kinds of religious deprivations have been presented in a series of
cases involving allegations by Black Muslims of interference with their exer-
cise of religious freedom. In a flurry of recent cases, 1 0 the courts have had to
162. 44 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (1957).
163. 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961).
164. Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d
196 (4th Cir. 1961) ; Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962) ; In re Jones,
22 Cal. Rptr. 478, 372 P.2d 310 (1962) ; In the Matter of Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d
531, 180 N.E.2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962).
165. See note 162 mpra.
166. See cases cited at note 164 supra; In re Ferguson, suPra note 163.
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deal with complaints alleging interference with religious freedom, discrimina-
tory treatment, and punishment inflicted as the result of attempts to practice
their religious faith. The courts' response to these complaints makes clear
that the way in which the claimant seeks to exercise that freedom will affect
whether denial of a particular mode of religious expression is deemed a struc-
tural or non-structural deprivation. In cases where Black Muslims have been
singled out for differential treatment merely because of their faith, the courts
have held that allegations of such discriminatory treatment stated a claim for
which relief could be granted."10' Review of denials of religious freedom be-
comes more complex when the exercise of religious belief involves action.
For systemic factors are clearly involved when the prisoner claims the right
to hold prayer meetings ;168 to communicate with counsel concerning infringe-
ment of religious liberties ;109 to wear religious medals ;17o to communicate
freely with religious leaders and receive religious publications ;171 to preach
race hatred based upon a religious belief in Negro supremacy ;172 and to resist
the authority of white prison guards because of religiously formed racial be-
liefs.l't
Only one court has taken the position that Black Muslim prayer meetings
may legitimately be prohibited:
in light of the potentially serious dangers to the established prison society
presented by the Muslim beliefs and actions, it cannot be said that the
present, suppressive approach by the Director of Corrections is an abuse
of his discretionary power to mange our prison system. 174
Other courts have held that total religious suppression, prohibition of prayer
meetings, or continual discriminatory treatment of this sect constitutes a denial
of the constitutional guarantee contained in the first amendment. 176 Their
response to other allegations by Black Muslims of infringements on religious
liberty has varied depending on the particular deprivation alleged and the
particular relief requested.
In In the Matter of Brown v. McGinnis, 70 where petitioner alleged that
prison authorities would not permit the holding of religious services for Black
Muslims, the New York Court of Appeals ordered the Commissioner of Pri-
sons to promulgate such regulations as would secure those rights guaranteed
by the Constitution in a manner consistent with considerations of prison ad-
167. Pierce v. LaVallee, supra note 164; Sewell v. Pegelow, supra note 164; Fulwood
v. Clemmer, supra note 164; In the Matter of Brown v. McGinnis, supra note 164.
168. See Pierce v. LaVallee, supra note 164; In re Ferguson, supra note 163.
169. See Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 164; In re Ferguson, supra note 163.
170. Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 164.
171. Ibid., In the Matter of Brown v. McGinnis, supra note 164.
172. Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 164; it re Ferguson, supra note 163,
173. In re Ferguson, supra note 163.
174. In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d at 673, 361 P.2d at 422. There is an indication of a
retreat from this position in In re Jones, supra note 164.
175. See cases cited at note 164 supra.
176. 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E.2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962).
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ministration and discipline. While this will not necessarily relieve the court of
the ultimate responsibility of judging the reasonableness of the regulations
promulgated, it will permit those persons most familiar with the particular in-
stitution to devise the most satisfactory accommodation of conflicting interests.
In Pierce v. La Vallee 177 and Sewell v. Pegclow,1 s two federal courts held
that a petition alleging discriminatory treatment because of religion stated a
cause of action entitling the Black Muslim plaintiffs to relief under the Federal
Civil Rights Act. Segregation and discrimination merely because of belief can-
not be justified by systemic considerations.
In the latest such case, Fulwood v. Clemmery a the court dealt with a
series of demands which demonstrates the range and variety of situations that
may arise in the religious context. Relief was denied for two of the depriva-
tions alleged because these were felt to derive from systemic considerations.
Thus, the court approved a decision by prison officials to discipline the peti-
tioner for inflammatory racial remarks made at a prayer meeting on a base-
ball field where many non-Muslims were within hearing range. Significantly
it drew upon a non-prison case 180 involving the application of the first amend-
ment to "fighting words" in ascertaining the first amendment rights of inmates.
Similarly the court held that the refusal by prison officials to permit the
plaintiff to correspond with the leader of his religious sect or to receive a news-
paper containing a column by that leader was a proper exercise of administra-
tive discretion. For reasons that have already been explored, deprivations re-
sulting from the restrictions upon prisoner mail will tend to be treated as
structural by the courts.
Three other deprivations were held to be impermissible. The first such
deprivation has already been dealt with in the context of freedom of movenent.
The court held that even when an offense had been committed-that of pro-
claiming religiously derived racist doctrines in an inflammatory setting-the
extended penalty imposed was too severe for reasons which shed light on
where courts will draw the line in the religious context between systemic and
non-systemic deprivations. First, the court may have felt that while the in-
flammatory words were not protected by the first amendment, the sanction
imposed may have been too severe not only because it kept the petitioner in
isolation apart from the general prison population, but also because it deprived
the plaintiff, one of the Black Muslim leaders, of all opportunity to participate
in prayer meetings or mingle with his co-religionists. Second, the sanction was
excessive because it was not only imposed as punishment for the offense but
for the additional improper "purpose of suppressing. . . the Muslim religion
in the prison."18' The other two deprivations are particularly significant be-
cause the court, in condemning them, demonstrated the manner in which courts
177. 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
178. 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).
179. 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
180. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
181. 206 F. Supp. at 379.
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will be able to utilize existing regulations and practices in deciding whether a
particular deprivation is a necessary concomitant of imprisonment. The court
condemned the denial of chapel facilities to Black Muslims on two separate
grounds. Its principal ground was that such denial constituted a violation of a
regulation of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia requiring public
facilities to be made available to all persons without regard to race or religion.
The second ground, while related, is somewhat different: the state not only al-
lowed but encouraged and supported the holding of religious services in prison
for other denominations. Thus, unlike the McBride v. McCorklc situation, the
court believed that doing away with a discriminatory practice would not in-
volve a major reallocation of resources to, or reorganization of, a system which
had adequate facilities for holding services and which permitted and supported
such services. Similarly, the court used this dual basis for holding illegal the
confiscation and prohibition of Muslim religious medals. First, it held such
discrimination violative of the Commissioner's order prohibiting all discrimina-
tion on the basis of race or religion. But second, it seems to have been in-
fluenced by the extent to which prison practice sanctioned and indeed supplied
such medals. Conceivably, all religious medallions could be barred on structural
grounds (i.e., they could be turned into dangerous implements) but the court
refused to allow the confiscation of one denomination's medals on the grounds
they were "symbolic of the Muslim doctrine of bate and tend to create in the
prison community race tension and disruptive influences." To the extent that
identification with a minority religious group has throughout history been the
source of persecution, the court (in the light of its decision that the Black
Muslim faith was a bona fide religion) could not very well tolerate a prohibi-
tion against wearing religious identification on the grounds that mere identi-
fication incited hatred or tension.
Deprivation of Sexual Relations. Although the effects of sexual deprivation
on individual prisoners and on the structure of the inmate society have been
widely noted,182 apparently no prisoner has attempted to contest this particular
182. See Wilde, Ballad of Reading Gaol:
With bars they blur the goodly sun
And blur the goodly moon:
And they do well to hide their Hell
For in it things are done
That Son of God, nor Son of Man,
Ever should look upon.
Each wretched cell in which we dwell
Is a foul and dank latrine:
And the fetid breath of living death
Chokes up each grated screen;
And all, but Lust, is turned to dust
In Humanity's Machine.
The vilest deeds, like prison weeds
Bloom well in prison air
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deprivation. Homosexual activity is grounds for disciplinary action within pri-
son. No defense based on necessity, duress, self-defense, or provocation has
yet reached the court in the form of a challenge to such disciplinary action.
However, one wife has attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to secure conjugal
visits through court order. 83 The deprivation of heterosexual relations is more
extensive than mere confinement in an all male society for a period of certain
duration. In many states, incarceration of the spouse constitutes grounds for
divorce,' s4 thus making present deprivation more intense because the resump-
tion of conjugal relations is ever in jeopardy. It seems relatively dear, if only
from the absence of cases under the hands-off doctrine contesting these de-
privations, that sexual deprivation is assumed by inmates and custodians alike
to be a necessary concomitant of prison life. It also seems clear that courts will
treat such deprivations as systemic. Experiments in other countries with family
penal colonies, conjugal visiting in prison, and visits home by prisoners
demonstrate that even this kind of deprivation is not one inherent in the structure
of all penal institutions. 8 5 In fact, such departures from what we deem to be a
"necessary" deprivation illustrates the point that systemic deprivations may
never be absolutely necessary but rather are likely to be, in large part, cultural-
ly determined.186
Deprivation of Security of the Person. Life in prison contains innumerable
dangers against which the prisoner has been able to secure only partial and
generally unsatisfactory protection.187 Injuries come from many sources: from
It is only what is good in man
That wastes and withers there.
See also SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAIrIVErs 70-72, 95-99 (1958) ; Donz;u CT nonmn Tin
PRisoN Coxmmnrry (1958) ; BsAN-rs & Ta-rus, NEw HoRuzoNs n; CRI11WoroGv 616-24
(rev. ed. 1950) ; Fis m A, Snx nr Psxsox (1935) ; Zemans & CavanA Marital Relation-
ships of Prisoners in Twenty Eight Countries (pts. 1-2), 49 J. Can,. I., C. & P.S. 50, 133
(1958); Devereux & Moos, The Social Structure of Prisons and the Organic Tensions,
4 J. Cm. PSYCHOPATHOLOy 306 (1942).
183. Payne v. District of Columbia, 253 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
184. Tappan, The Legal Rights of Prisoners, 293 ANxALs 99, 101 n.17 (May, 1954).
Furthermore, sexual abstinence in some degree may be imposed as a condition of parole.
von Hentig, Degrees of Parole Violation and Graded Remedial Measures, 33 J. Cr=n. L.,
C. & P.S. 363, 365 (1943).
185. See Zemans & Cavan, supra note 182; Syr.Es 70.
186. If a prisoner can sue the government for injuries which were inflicted on him by
other prisoners because of the negligence of a guard (and Muniz v. United States, 305 F.Zd
285 (2d Cir. 1962), appears to make this possible), then a homosexual assault by one pris-
oner on another may, under certain circumstances, give rise to government liability. To the
extent that the power structure of the inmate society as described by Sykes and others is
built in part on a network of both consensual and forced homosexcual relations, which are
carried on with the tacit approval of the prison guards, the creation of liability for such
assaults may lead to a radical restructuring of the inmate society. See authorities cited at
note 182 supra.
187. SYxEs 76-78; see also note 11 supra.
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other prisoners,18 from guards, 8 9 from disciplinary measures,10 from lack of
adequate medical care,'0 ' from defective machinery 192 and from all the usual
sources of injuries present in our everyday world.103 Injuries from all these
sources have in varying degrees been held non-compensable tinder the hands-
off doctrine.
Probably those injuries for which relief has been most difficult to obtain are
disciplinary measures. Thus, solitary confinement with or without withdrawal
of all privileges, 0 4 "The Hole,"'1 5 and bread and water for extended peri-
ods,' 96 have all been treated as non-reviewable exercises of the authority which
Congress and state legislatures have vested in prison officials. Because of the
absence of judicial review of such officials' actions, it is likely that a guard,
wishing to take out a grudge against a prisoner, would not have to look far
to find a pretext which would give his act the appearance of being a discre-
tionary discharge of his official function.' 97 Further, the punishment actually
inflicted may bear no relationship to the violation prompting it. A decision to
transfer a prisoner from one institution to another also lies within the non-re-
188. [T]here were approximately 1000 assaults (inmate on inmate) in federal prisons
during 1961. 3 Bureau of Prisons (Dept. of Justice), Basic Data 49 (revised ed.
Dec. 1961).
Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253, 279 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granied, 31 U.S.L. Wr:ic
3183 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1962) (prisoner brutally beaten by members of a hostile prison gang).
See also Burdick v. State, 206 Misc. 839, 135 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Ct. Cl. 1954), aft'd, 286 App,
Div. 988, 144 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1955) (plaintiff slashed with safety razor by fellow inmate);
Mobley v. State, 1 App. Div. 2d 731, 147 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1955) (inmate stabbed to death);
Davis C., So You're Going to Prison!, 191 THE NATiON 435 (1960); cf. DOSTOY.Vgsy,
HOUSE OF THE DEAD.
189. Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1952) (facts in dissenting opinion:
allegedly beaten into unconsciousness with a nine pound strap with metal prongs and forced
to serve as a "gal-boy" or female for the homosexuals among the prisoners) ; Johnson v.
Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir.), rev'd, 338 U.S. 864 (1949) ; Carder v. Steiner, 225 Md. 271,
170 A.2d 220 (1961) ; State v. Carpenter, 231 N.C. 229, 56 S.E.2d 713 (1949).
190. Sweeney v. Woodall, supra note 189; Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370
(D.D.C. 1962) ; Johnson v. Dye, supra note 189; In re Jones, 22 Cal. Rptr. 478, 372 P.2d
310 (1962) ; State v. Carpenter, supra note 189.
191. See, e.g., Snow v. Roche, 143 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 788
(1944) ; Golub v. Krimsky, 185 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ; Bush v. Babb, 23 Il. App,
2d 285, 162 N.E.2d 594 (App. Ct. 1959).
192. Melton v. State, 198 Misc. 654, 99 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Ct. Cl. 1950), appeal dismissed,
108 N.Y.S.2d 967 (App. Div. 1951).
193. Van Zuch v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) ; Shew v. United
States, 116 F. Supp. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1953) ; Webb v. State, 206 Misc. 512, 134 N.Y.S.2d 9
(Ct. Cl. 1954), aff'd, 286 App. Div. 945, 142 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1955) ; Valentine v. State, 197
Misc. 972, 95 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Ct. Cl. 1950), aff'd, 277 App. Div. 1069, 100 N.Y.S.2d 567
(1950), appeal denied, 277 App. Div. 1080, 101 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1950).
194. McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891) ; Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th
Cir. 1952).
195. Snow v. Roche, 143 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 788 (1944) ; State
v. Doolittle, 122 Conn. Supp. 32, 158 A.2d 858 (Super. Ct. 1960).
196. State v. Doolittle, supra note 195.
197. See notes 189-90 supra.
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viewable province of prison officials' discretion.10 8 To the extent that an in-
dividual has wrested a certain security from the inmate society in which he
has won some degree of acceptance, 199 any transfer means that the same perils
must be encountered again. The prisoner can thus be subjected to increased
dangers by a transfer from one cell block to another, from jail to a peni-
tentiary,20° from a juvenile home to a prison,20 1 or from a penitentiary to an
insane asylum..2 0
2
Despite the application of the hands-off doctrine to these situations, depriva-
tions of security of the person have generally been of greater concern to society
and to the courts than many of the other deprivations which convicts endure.
Thus, prison jailers have long been held liable for dereliction from duty where
their negligence was sufficiently gross as to divest them of the discretionary
immunity of officials. 203 Prison authorities have generally been required to
provide ordinary medical care for the sick and injured, although a few cases
hold that failure to provide such care is discretionary and does not give rise to
liability.2 °4 And Congress and some states have established a form of workmen's
compensation for injuries resulting from prison industry.20 5 To the extent that
these evidence a concern for the physical well-being of prisoners, it is likely
that courts will, upon abandonment of the hands-off doctrine, be particularly
198. Duncan v. Madigan, 278 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960); Zerbst v. Kidwell, 92 F.2d
756 (5th Cir. 1937), affirming Kidwell v. Zerbst, 19 F. Supp. 475 (N.D. Ga. 1937) ; Rosen-
berg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ; People ex rel Harris v. LaVallee, 229
N.Y.S2d 321 (App. Div. 1962).
199. For a description of this process and its perils see SYxEs 87-105; the gains de-
rived from such an adjustment are summarized at id., 106-08.
200. Gorsuch v. United States, 34 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1929); Commissioner ex rel.
Radziewicz v. Burke, 67 Montg. 9, aff'd, 169 Pa. Super. 263, 82 A.2d 252 (1951).
201. See Arkadiele v. Markley, 186 F. Supp. 586 (S.D. Ind. 1960) ; United States v.
McCoy, 150 F. Supp. 237, 239 (M.D. Pa. 1957); Suarez v. Wilkinson, 133 F. Supp. 38
M.D. Pa. 1955). But see Kautter v. Reid, 183 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1960); United States
ex rel. Stinnett v. Hegstrom, 178 F. Supp. 17 (D. Corm 1959) ; White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp.
647 (D.D.C. 1954).
202. See Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276 (Sth Cir. 1951) ; Rosheisen, v. Steele, 193 F.2d
273 (8th Cir. 1951) ; Ex parte Soborsky, 109 Vt. 476, 199 A. 757 (1938). But see, People
ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215 N.Y.S2d 44 (1961).
203. See cases collected in Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1962).
However, regulations prohibiting the commencement of civil suits while in prison have
seriously undermined the effectiveness of this remedy. Furthermore, even where the released
prisoner is successful in obtaining a judgment, the potential earning power of one convicted
of a crime is likely to limit sharply the size of an award. And given prison salaries, even
small judgments are likely to be uncollectable.
204. See, e.g., Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962), ccrt. granlcd, 31
U.S.L. WEK 3183 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1962) (No. 464); Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477
(E.D. Ill. 1948) ; McCrossen v. State, 277 App. Div. 1160, 101 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1950) ; see also
18 U.S.C. § 4005 (a) (1948) ; but see cases cited note 191 supra.
205. 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1951), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1961); see also con-
curring opinion of Justice Smith in Shain v. Idaho State Penitentiary, 77 Idaho 292, 291
P.2d 870 (1955), for a recognition of the obligation of states to provide similar accident
coverage.
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prone to provide remedies for physical dangers or injuries to the person. To
be sure, the high incidence of inmate assaults may make physical insecurity
seem an inevitable concomitant of prison life.20 6 Nonetheless, it is likely that,
with the abandonment of the hands-off doctrine, the more extreme forms of
physical danger will increasingly be eliminated or alleviated. First, disciplinary
action involving excessive force, or punishment bearing no relation to the
offense will, as seen earlier, result in intervention by the courts.20 7 Particularly
where prison regulations prescribe general rules for discipline, it may be ex-
pected that courts will hold prison officials to these standards.208 And there
is at least one case where a court went still further and refused to condone
the punishment of handcuffing prisoners to the bars of their cells for extended
periods, although testimony clearly established that this mode of punishment
was specified in the regulations and was customarily inflicted for trivial of-
fenses in prison camps throughout the state.20
9
Second, transfers to other institutions may call forth insistence by the courts
on a right to hearing, possibly to legal representation, and certainly, to noti-
fication to relatives.210 Most transfers, though, will probably continue to be
deemed matters of administrative discretion 21 ' and only those involving a
sharp increase in deprivational level will be scrutinized by the court and some
formal showing of cause required for the transfer.
Third, and possibly most significant, abandonment of the hands-off doctrine
may result in major developments in the tort remedies available to prisoners.
At least two such developments have been presaged by the Second Circuit's
holdings in Winston v. United States 21 2 and Muniz v. United States.213 First,
the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the Federal Tort Claims Act
may be extended to prisoners. Until the Winston and Muniz cases, courts had
excepted prisoners from this waiver of immunity on grounds that Congress
could not have intended the Federal Tort Claims Act to apply in this realm,
even though prisons were not listed as one of the specific exceptions to the
waiver.214 Congressional intent on this issue is difficult to ascertain1 and
has in part been inferred from the hands-off doctrine: Congress could not have
206. See WILKINSON, REPORT, PROTErCTIoN AND CONTROL OF PISONERS (1962) re-
printed in Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253, 279 n.14 (1962).
207. See Gordon v. Garrson 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948) ; see also text accont-
panying notes 130-40 supra.
208. See cases cited at note 123 supra and accompanying text.
209. State v. Carpenter, 231 N.C. 229, 56 S.E.2d 713 (1949).
210. See People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215 N.Y.S.
2d 44 (1961).
211. See note 198 mupra.
212. 305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3183 (U.S. Dec. 4,
1962) (No. 464).
213. 305 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3183 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1962)
(No. 464).
214. A comprehensive list of prior cases was compiled, by the dissent in Winston, supra
note 212, at 258.
215. See the learned, and most indecisive, debate on this subject carried on in the
majority's and dissent's opinions in Winston.
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intended the courts to become involved in a realm where judicial supervision
of and intervention in the administration of a prison would be extremely
detrimental to discipline.2 16 If the courts abandon the hands-off doctrine, much
of the basis for the argument from Congressional intent will go. And indeed,
the Second Circuit, in holding that the Federal Torts Claims Act does apply to
prisoners, explicitly rejected the hands-off doctrine 2 1 7 and the argument based
on detriment to discipline.218 Thus, it is likely that one of the consequences of
abandonment of the hands-off doctrine is that waivers of sovereign immunity
to tort action will now be construed as extending to prisons.
It is to be anticipated, once courts hold that the Federal Tort Claims Act
extends to prisons, that most actions by prison officials will not be treated as
coming under the exception contained in that act providing that "discretionary
actions" cannot be the basis of tort suits against the government.2 10 The con-
siderations which militated for the abrogation of sovereign immunity and the
extension of the waiver to prisoners similarly indicate that the "discretionary"
exception contained in the act should be construed narrowly. Thus, the ra-
tionales of risk spreading, deep pocket, enterprise liability and moral responsi-
bility which have been advanced against sovereign immunity to tort suits
similarly suggest that exceptions to that immunity should not be construed so
broadly as effectively to nullify the waiver.2" The distinction between discre-
tionary and non-discretionary (or ministerial) acts is not a very dear one and
practically every action of a prison official could be termed discretionary in
some degree:
It would be difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly
ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its per-
formance, even if it involved only the driving of a nail.2'
216. See the dissent's discussion in Winston, .supra note 212, at 276-82.
217. See portion of Muniz opinion reprinted at text accompanying note 54 supra.
218. The results on discipline could hardly be worse when the government is sued than
when individual prison employees or officials are defendants. And since the latter
class of suits, though possible for some time, seem to have brought neither a multi-
plicity of suits nor an impairment of prison discipline, the assertion that suits directly
against the government would have these results is at best dubious.
Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. WrEM
3183 (U.S. Dec. 4,1962) (No. 464).
See also id. at 271-72 for a restatement of this point.
219. See note 43 supra for an indication of how the government will attempt to bring
existing precedent to bear on. this point. See also note 44 stupra for a criticism of this at-
tempt.
220. In construing the Federal Tort Claims Act the majority pointed out that it "had
been instructed by the Supreme Court to give the Act a liberal construction consistent with
the broad purpose underlying its enactment." Winston v. United States, supra note 218,
at 270. For a discussion of theories of risk distribution see Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YArx L.J. 499 (1961); 2 HAUPER & JAm2s,
THE LAw OF ToRTs 759-64 (1956) ; CAmze, THE P RICAarnN OF Droc &rc M.,A 45-73
(1961).
221. Han v. Los Angeles County, 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 Pac. 462, 463 (1920).
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Since these categories are conclusory, it seems clear that other considerations
will determine whether an act is classified as ministerial or discretionary. The
smaller the sphere of official actions which are treated as discretionary for pur-
poses of the Federal Torts Claims Act, the further this society will have gone
within the tort context toward establishing a guarantee that the convicted
criminal will not emerge from imprisonment in drastically worse condition than
when he entered. And it hardly seems so radical to back that guarantee with the
promise of a remedy in damages when mishaps occur. To the extent that our
society espouses a rehabilitative principle, granting of such liability would also be
consistent with the tenet that, under a correctional system, inmates should under-
go the minimum possible deprivation necessary to their rehabilitation. 222
There is still another reason for construing the exception of "discretionary"
narrowly so as to increase liability. This reason also suggests that the fault con-
cept which is the basis of liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act may be
too limited a one for such an institution as our penal system. But such reason-
ing, a fortiori, is grounds for extending liability so far as the fault concept
permits by construing narrowly the "discretionary" exception. This argument
starts from the position that the prison is, in Goffman's term, a "total institu-
tion" 223 and suggests that it may be most appropriate to view injuries oc-
curring within the the system as a species of industrial accident. Just as we
have learned that a certain rate of injury is a necessary concomitant of in-
dustrial life and that it makes little sense to approach such injuries in terms
of cause or negligence,224 so an attempt to pinpoint blame in the context of a
total institution may be beside the point. And some form of strict enterprise
liability may be more appropriate.
It is possible to argue, as the dissent did in Winston and Muni--, that a cer-
tain probability of injury necessarily attends imprisonment and that if this is to
be remedied, it must be done by legislative action. The majority, however, took a
contrary view. It decided to consider the Federal Tort Claims Act as a declara-
tion by Congress that the entire cost of the risk of physical injury incurred
in prison should not be borne by prisoners and that, at least where fault could
be shown, the government rather than the individual prisoner should bear such
costs. Having taken this position, they declined at this stage to treat the in-
jury to the plaintiffs as resulting from discretionary actions.
The allegations in the Muniz case indicate how narrowly the discretionary
exemption to liability may be construed. Muniz alleged that he was injured by
twelve prisoners who pursued him from one building, across an open space and
into another penitentiary building. He further alleged that a guard, seeing this,
locked him into this building with the twelve hostile inmates, rather than help-
ing him or summoning aid and that the TJnited States, because of the negligence
222. See Professor George H. Dessioies Final Draft of the Code of Correctiot for
Puerto Rico, 71 YALE L.J. 1054, 1117-18 (1962).
223. Goffman, Characteristics of Total Institutions, Symposiumx ON PRvVENTIVE AND
SociAL PSYCHIATRY (1957), reprinted in part in DONNELLY, ET AL. 429-32 (1962).
224. See Calabresi, supra note 220; HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 220.
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of this guard and because of its own failure to provide adequate supervision to
assure the safety of inmates, should be liable for the injuries sustained. - The
sources of both the violence and the guard's actions may, however, be equally
deep rooted. When tvelve prisoners pursue, assault, injure, and blind a fellow
prisoner, it is not inconceivable that the attack may relate either to the power
structure of the inmate society or to the depth and range of hostilities to which
prison situations are bound to give rise. When a guard declines to step in and
prevent injury which is obviously imminent, numerous factors such as prison
practices and regulations or the ratio of guards to prisoners may enter into such
calculations as might be made at a moment of stress. However, even if the con-
cept of fault may not seem automatically applicable or particularly relevant,;-
doctrines of negligence and proximate cause have long been recognized as the
vehicles for social policies concerning when and on whom liability should be im-
posed22 7
Deprivation of Property. Strictly speaking, the only property interests of
which a prisoner is deprived are those interests which were enforceable prior to
imprisonment and which he can no longer further protect because of commit-
ment.22 8 While forfeiture of property by operation of law no longer attends con-
viction for a felony, it is evident that a going business or chose in action can
perish from forced inaction as well as from confiscation. 2 9 Courts have invoked
the hands-off doctrine to uphold regulations which prevent a prisoner from en-
gaging in the active management of his business.2 30 Although inmates have been
permitted to protect certain property interests through duly appointed counsel
against suits by creditors, wives, and other daimants2 31 it is not clear that a
prisoner in isolation has even this protection.232
If the concept of property is broadened to include those goods and claims
which can be acquired after imprisonment, the deprivation of property rights
225. Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285, 286 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L.
WEEK 3183 (U.S. Dec. 4,1962) (No. 464).
226. The structural dimensions of this violence and the structural implications of creat-
ing liability for it were pointed out by the dissent, 305 F.2d 260 n.10. The dissent intimates
that this injury was inflicted during an inmate riot of considerable dimensions. If, upon a
trial of the facts, it appears that there was a riot, then the guard's actions would certainly
seem more reasonable than if his disregarding of Muniz' plight and his locking of the doors
occurred when there was substantial order in the rest of the prison. Muniz' complaint makes
no mention of any riot and clearly this will be a contested issue of fact, if Muniz' right to sue
under the Federal Tort Claims Act is sustained.
227. See Judge Andrew's dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.IL, 248 N.Y. 339, 162
N.E. 99 (1928).
228. Deprivations of property resulting from the operation of statutes lie outside the
scope of this Comment which is concerned only with administratively caused deprivations.
229. See, e.g., Pallas v. Misericordia Hospital, 291 N.Y. 692, 52 N.E2d 590 (1943).
230. See, e.g., Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951); Siegel v. Ragen, 180
F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950) (alleged confiscation of a type-
writer).
231. See, e.g., People v. Lawrence, 140 Cal. App. 2d 133, 295 P.2d 4 (Dist. Ct App.
1956) ; Nastasi v. State, 186 Misc. 1051, 61 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Ct. CL 1946).
232. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 638 (9th Cir. 1961).
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undergone by the inmate becomes far more extensive. The prisoner may be
compelled to work but has no right to receive wages for that work.2 8 Wages
which do accrue to him at prison-established rates can not be expended as he
wishes even if the objects he wishes to purchase are not contraband. 2 4 Those
goods which he is allowed to purchase "with his own money" can be taken from
him, and he can be either partially or totally denied their use.285 This is true
not only of goods purchased but also of objects created by the prisoner "on his
own time." Manuscripts and correspondence can be confiscated for the dura-
tion of a prisoner's term 280 and the patenting of inventions prohibited. 21 Ad-
ministrative decisions imposing these and other deprivations of property have
been deemed beyond the scope of judicial review.
Within this category of deprivations, it is particularly difficult to hazard a
prediction on the effects of abandoning the hands-off doctrine. One thing, how-
ever, is relatively certain: prisoners will not be allowed to retain or enjoy un-
limited (or even extensive) personal possessions while in prison. Whatever
embitterment may result from deprivations of the innumerable personal luxur-
ies which the general population enjoys, courts will show a marked deference
to the decisions of prison officials restricting the amount and types of personal
possessions enjoyed in prison. Many types of seemingly innocuous possessions
in the hands of a determined and ingenious prisoner can become implements
of assault and escape. Moreover, personal wealth held and enjoyed by an in-
mate will not only cause dissension among the prisoners but will provide
a source of strength and authority within the inmate society and a means for
corrupting the prison staff.288 Thus, approval by Judge Solomon in Bailleux
v. Holes 29 of restrictions on the right of inmates to use private funds and on
their right to keep law books in their cells is indicative of the attitude likely
to prevail toward the retention and use of private property by inmates. Al-
though the court in Bailleux v. Holmes was only concerned with one type of
structural consideration-the disruption that would result from "prison
lawyers" using their skills and law libraries to secure favors and goods from
other prisoners-a recent Supreme Court decision, Lanza v. New York,2 40 in-
dicates that none of the private property rights associated with life in the out-
side world are likely to have any relevance to prison life. Mr. Justice Stewart
stated that the right of privacy can hardly obtain in prison, for
233. See, e.g., State Bd. of Charities and Corrections v. Hays, 190 Ky. 147, 227 S.W.
282 (1920). See also Shain v. Idaho State Penitentiary, 77 Idaho 292, 291 P.2d 870 (1955)
(dictum) ; Dice v. Board of County Com'rs, 178 Kan. 523, 239 P.2d 782 (1955) (dictum).
234. Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959) ; Piccoli v. Board of Trus-
tees, 87 F. Supp. 672 (D. N.H. 1949).
235. Ibid.; Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950).
236. Davis v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 345 P.2d 513 (Dist. Ct. App, 1959)
Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951).
237. United States v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 846 (1954).
238. See text accompanying notes 157-58 snpra.
239. 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959).
240. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
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it is obvious that a jail shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home,
an automobile, an office, or a hotel room. In prison, official surveillance has
traditionally been the order of the day.2-41
By implication he approved a prison regulation reproduced in a footnote to
the above statement which makes clear that prison security necessitates ex-
treme restrictions on access to and possession of personal property:
Saws have been secreted in bananas, in the soles of shoes, under the peaks
of caps, and drugs may be secreted in cap visors, under postage stamps on
letters, in cigars and various other ways ....
Cells should be systematically searched for materials which would serve as
a weapon or medium of self-destruction or escape. Razor blades are small
and easily concealed. 2
Deprivation of Effective Remedial Safeguards. Even if we were to assume
that all the foregoing deprivations would receive review on the merits, there
would still remain another and perhaps most fundamental class of deprivations
which impair or destroy a prisoner's ability to present an issue to the courts and
press that issue to a successful conclusion. Foremost among such deprivations is
the common prison policy sanctioned by courts under the hands-off doctrine that
prohibits inmates from instituting civil proceedings.243 This policy clearly ap-
plies to actions involving the prisoner's affairs prior to conviction and to actions
for damages against prison officials. It does not apply to habeas corpus petitions
and probably does not apply to suits demanding injunctive relief for prison de-
privations. This administrative counterpart of civil death statutes may work ir-
remediable damage to the inmate's alleged cause of action. Even where the
statute of limitations does not run, the passage of time increases problems of
proof which are difficult for a convict to surmount even at the time a possible
cause of action arises.24 4 The testimony of a convicted felon may be impeached
as unreliable.2 45 If the witness is a fellow inmate still serving his sentence, the
courts are reluctant to compel prison officials to permit him to testify in a civil
proceeding.24 6 Fellow inmates, who are frequently the only witnesses, may be re-
leased or transferred, and therefore unobtainable. Even if their whereabouts
can be ascertained, the passage of years will decrease the probative value of
their testimony. Whether depositions will prove a satisfactory alternative will
depend on the peculiarities of each case. If the case involves a tort action
against a prison official, pressure by officials may have an effect upon the con-
241. Id. at 143.
242. Id. at 142 n.14.
243. See, e.g., Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1955).
244. Note, Prisoners' Remedies for Mistreatment, 59 YALE L.J. 800, 801 (1950).
245. McCoOSIcK, EvmENCE § 43 (1954) ; It re Jones, 22 Cal. Rptr. 478, 482, 372 P2d
310, 314 (1962).
246. Edgerly v. Kennelly, 215 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1954) ; DeCloux v. Johnston, 70 F.
Supp. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1947) ; People v. Lawrence, 140 Cal. App. 2d 133, 295 P.2d 4 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1956) ; but see People v. Smith, 108 Cal. App. 2d 696, 239 P.2d 466 (Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied sub nwon. Smith v. California, 343 U.S. 936 (1952).
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tents of the depositions and the plaintiff will have no opportunity to elicit
further information by direct examination.247
Prison policies pose numerous other obstacles to inmates attempting to pre-
sent claims to the courts. Again courts have tended to permit these obstacles
by treating them as matters of internal prison management not subject to re-
view by the courts. 248 The following is a partial list of the difficulties which
beset an inmate in initiating a legal proceeding: a prison may possess very few
law books ;240 a prisoner may be permitted to use only a certain percentage of
his funds to purchase law materials ;250 a prison administrator may permissibly
rule that legal materials can be obtained only from the publisher and not from
relatives or friends 2 51 thus raising the cost prohibitively; a prisoner may not
be allowed to keep for use in his cell those legal materials he has purchased ;262
considerable delay in using the prison's law library may be encountered ;25 a
prisoner will normally not be permitted to obtain the help of another inmate in
filling out a petition ;254 restrictions on the selection of and communications
with counsel may be imposed ;255 prison officials may process court petitions
and, while they do not have the right to pass on the validity of the complaint
or delay its mailing unreasonably,25 G there are indications that prison officials
continue to screen out many petitions. 257
Whereas it is fairly clear that abandonment of the hands-off doctrine will
bring little change in present prison practices regarding deprivation of sexual
relations and property, it is clear that courts proceeding without the hands-off
doctrine will be prepared to impose far reaching demands on the prison system
to remove the restrictions which impede or prevent a prisoner from contesting
the legality of a deprivation.
247. See, e.g., the allegations of pressure by prison, officials made in Siegel v. Ragen,
180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950), and the demonstrated instances
of such coercion in Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); and In re
Riddle, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304 (1962) (punishment for making false accusations
in petitions to court before court had passed on such allegations).
248. Wilson v. Dixon, 251 F.2d 338 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 856 (1958)
Grove v. Smyth, 169 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Va. 1958); Miller v. Wilkins, 220 N.Y.S.2d 671
(Sup. Ct. 1961) ; People ex rel. Dafoe v. Jackson. 46 N.Y.S.2d 904 (App. Div. 1944);
Application of Chessman, 44 Cal. 2d 1, 279 P.2d 24 (1955).
249. Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959).
250. Id. at 365.
251. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 639 (9th Cir. 1961).
252. Ibid.; Piccoli v. Board of Trustees, 87 F. Supp. 672 (D. N.H. 1949).
253. Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361, 363 (D. Ore. 1959).
254. Wilson v. Dixon, 251 F.2d 338 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 856 (1958);
Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 639 (9th Cir. 1961).
255. Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361, 364 (D. Ore. 1959) ; United States ex rel.
Vraniak v. Randolph, 161 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ill. 1958); Gambadoro v. LaVallec, 20 Misc,
2d 554, 199 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
256. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951) ; Spires v. Dowd, 271
F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1959).
257. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 762 n.1 (1945) ; Clark, Federal Procedural Reform
and States' Rights: To a More Perfect Union, 40 TEx. L.R. 211, 218-19 (1962) ; Schaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 19-26 (1956).
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The first of such demands has already been made clear by two recent cases:
courts will not permit prison officials to punish prisoners for making false
statements in petitions to the court or other appropriate authorities until the
merits of those petitions have been adjudged.258 Clearly the imposition of
punishments for making statements which criticize prison authorities is hardly
justified until the truth or falsity of those statements has been adjudged by
someone other than the party criticized.
It remains to be seen whether, after this prohibition of punishment prior to
adjudication becomes firmly entrenched in the law, the courts will hold that
petitions containing reasonable (or at least fairly debatable) contentions cannot
serve as a basis for punishment in prisons even if relief is denied by the courts
on grounds that the alleged deprivation is a "structural," "necessary," or
"reasonable one." It may be that any one with a colorable complaint should not
be penalized for attempting to pursue it.2 50 A critical issue in prisoners' rights
may thus come to be whether sanctions can be imposed for making allegations
in petitions where the court denies relief. Where the allegation of mistreat-
ment is clearly specious, some form of sanction should be permitted to dis-
courage both harassment and the resultant burdens placed upon the courts and
prison officials.2 60 Where the petition states contested issues of fact and law
where the resolution is by no means dear,- 1 these cases will take the greatest
time. If no punishment is imposed for making such allegations when they are
ultimately rejected by the court, the result will seem somewhat paradoxical:
those complaints which can be decided on summary judgment or by a swift
hearing will be most severely penalized though they work the least mischief-
and those petitions which result in the greatest inconvenience, expense, and
time will, even though unsuccessful, render the inmate immune to sanctions.
Nonetheless, if prisoners are made to bear the risk of punishment as well as
258. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 376-77 (D.D.C. 1962) ; In re Riddle, 22
Cal. Rptr. 472, 478, 372 P.2d 304, 308-09 (1962).
259. The court's statement in In re Riddle quoted at note 134 mipra does not attempt
to resolve the issue of what kind of allegation would be a false charge.
260. The court noted in In re Jones, 22 Cal. Rptr. 478, 372 P.2d 310 (1962), that the
hearing "lasted nine days during which a transcript of over 800 pages was compiled." 22
Cal. Rptr. at 480, 372 P2d at 312.
261. Such was the case in In re Riddle, mipra note 258. The following excerpt from
the court's opinion, presents the problem most vividly:
Petitioner makes much of the finding of the referee that "the amount of force" used
by correction officer Stanley in striking petitioner ork the head with a baton "is ques-
tionable as being fully justifiable" and contends that that finding means that "Stanley
used excessive force against him" . . . The amount of force used cannot be measured
by a micrometer, nor can it be considered separate and apart from the circumstances
existing at the time.... The last blow had the desired effect. It is certainly too bad
that Stanley hit him so hard. It is tragic that his skull was fractured. But Stanley,
under the circumstance could not, reasonably, be expected to measure carefully the
precise amount of force he should use.
22 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78, 372 P2d at 309-10.
It would not seem altogether equitable to impose further deprivations for having pro-
tested this injury.
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the risk of denial of relief for arguable claims, the result will be to undermine
seriously the right of prisoners to obtain remedies for mistreatment. And it
will impose on prisoners a duty of prescience which no lawyer would willingly
accept.
The second development likely to take place is clearly presaged by Judge
Solomon's opinion in Bailleaux v. Holmes2 62 Prior cases 2 3 had held that pri-
soner's access to legal materials was a matter within the peculiar competence
and discretion of prison authorities because it had to be resolved in the larger
contexts of use of free time and communication with the outside world. In re-
jecting those precedents, Judge Solomon analyzed the problem of availability of
legal materials in the context of the "basic right" of access to the courts. The
same subordination of administrative convenience to prisoner's rights which un-
derlay the Black Muslim cases is evident in the following passage from Judge
Solomon's opinion:
The Court appreciates the fact that prison authorities must maintain ef-
fective discipline, and must prevent unscrupulous prisoners from preying
on the weak and ignorant. However, this end may not be achieved by
stifling the study of law, where such study is necessary to the effective
utilization of a basic right. This does not mean that the prison authorities
are powerless to prevent the accumulation of massive legal libraries in
the cells. Regulations can be designed to avoid the excessive storage of
materials in cells without restricting the actual use of these materials in
the cells when needed.2 4
This decision was reversed in Hatfield v. Bailleaux,205 but the basis of the
reversal appears to have been in the Court of Appeals' analysis of the facts."00
The appellate opinion was concerned primarily with demonstrating that the
plaintiffs did, in fact, have adequate access to legal materials. The basic
proposition in Judge Solomon's opinion-that the right of access to the court
comprehends those preparatory steps necessary to utilize the right effectively-
still stands.
Four other cases 267 make clear that the basic "rights of preparation" may
apply not only in instances where the legitimacy of the petitioner's confinement
is contested but also in situations where one's treatment in prison is the basis
of the petition:
262. 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959).
263. Wilson v. Dixon, 251 F.2d 338 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 856 (1958);
Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Grove v. Smyth, 169
F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Va. 1958); Piccoli v. Board of Trustees, 87 F. Supp. 672 (D. N..H
1949).
264. 177 F. Supp. at 363.
265. 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
266. Id. at 637-38. Between the time Judge Solomon issued his injunction and April
11, 1961, the date of the reversal, there appears to have been some liberalization in prison
policies noted by the court in, Hatfield v. Bailleaux, supra note 265, at 638-39.
267. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962) ; In re Riddle, 22 Cal, Rptr,
472, 372 P.2d 304 (1962) ; In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, cert. denied, 368




It is manifest that the right of a prisoner to petition a court for redress of
alleged illegal restraints on his liberty is unreasonably eroded if the prison
authorities may be allowed to deny a prisoner the opportunity of procuring
counsel so that his petition for writ of habeas corpus or other mode of
redress always must be presented in propria persona. It must also be con-
ceded that when a prisoner is writing to an attorney in an attempt to
secure legal representation he must be allowed to set forth factual mat-
ters even though derogatory or critical of the prison authorities, since he
must persuade the attorney receiving the letter that the writer's rights as
a prisoner truly have been violated, so as to interest that attorney in the
prisoner's alleged case against the prison authorities. Therefore, it is an
abuse of discretion for prison regulations to be utilized so as to deny an
inmate the opportunity to procure with reasonable promptness, or to com-
municate with in a reasonably prompt manner, a member of the Bar on
matters relating to alleged violations of the prisoner's legal rights allegedly
suffered as a direct result of incarceration, even though the letter to the at-
torney may be critical of the prison authorities.26 s
Access to the courts is a right which dearly involves structural considerations.
Yet it should be deemed "non-structural" on a rationale analogous to that in-
volved in traditional habeas corpus proceedings. Just as it cannot be deemed a
structural necessity for the prison system to prevent persons from testing the
legality of their detention, so it should not be deemed necessary for the prison
system to employ methods which prevent a prisoner from testing the legality
of the imposition of other deprivations (albeit lesser ones). And given a system
which permits free access to the courts for the former purpose, permitting
challenges in the latter situation would not seem to work such radical changes
in the structure. Those structural arrangements which stand in the way of
an inquiry into the legality of official actions must yield to the basic need of
society to inquire whether prison officials are discharging their functions
properly. Unless the courts protect the channels of information which provide
the basis of an informed judgment on the legality or illegality of a deprivation,
it is useless for them to assert that they will or can decide such an issue on the
merits.
Beyond protecting the basic rights of preparation to petition the courts and
extending that right to petitions alleging mistreatment, it is difficult to predict
what developments will occur in this category upon rejection of the hands-off
doctrine. It is, for instance, unlikely that courts will overrule the administra-
tive policy discussed in Tabor v. Hardwick 2 69 prohibiting convicts from com-
mencing civil suits for damages while in prison. A convict probably gives up
to a certain extent the freedom to be litigious. Nonetheless, in situations where
administrative considerations result in the prohibition of tort suits against pri-
son officials or the state, the courts may begin to contrive means whereby evi-
dence available at the time of the event but unlikely to be unobtainable later
can be preserved through depositions and photographs. Thus, one may see
judicial innovations to alleviate those evidentiary problems which at present
hamstring the prisoner's tort remedies.
268. In re Ferguson, mipra note 267, 55 Cal. 2d at 677,361 P.2d at 425.
269. 224 F.2d 526 (Sth Cir. 1955).
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CONCLUSION
Any discussion of standards is, of course, highly conjectural and premature.
The first step, and that with which this Comment has been primarily con-
cerned, is the rejection of the prevailing rule that "it is not the function of the
courts to supervise the management of the prison system." If this doctrine is
abandoned, then standards will obviously have to be worked out on a case by
case, trial and error basis. The existing body of principles for review of ad-
ministrative agencies will serve as a guide to the courts-and even if judicial
intervention is, in some cases, ill considered, it may provide incentive for the
creation of adequate mechanisms for administrative review which are now
sorely lacking. Until the hands-off doctrine is abandoned, none of the existing
remedies are likely to be effective. Barring a radical departure from the pre-
vailing rule, prisoners will continue in much the same legal position as they
were nearly half a century ago when Shaw penned this standing indictment of
judicial abdication:
Judges spend their lives in consigning their fellow creatures to prison;
and when some whisper reaches them that prisons are horribly cruel and
destructive places, and that no creature fit to live should be sent there,
they only remark calmly that prisons are not meant to be comfortable;
which is no doubt the consideration that reconciled Pontius Pilate to the
practice of crucifixion. 27 0
270. SHAW, THE CRIME OF IMPRISONMENT 14 (1946), published as a preface to WsnDi,
ENGLISH PRISONS UNDER LocAL GOVERNMENT (1922).
The Journal expresses its appreciation, to Mr. Ephraim London for bringing this passage
to its attention.
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